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REBECCA L. BROWNt
Imagine the United States Constitution without a bill of rights.
Today, it is almost unthinkable. Our Constitution, however,
originated as seven articles dealing almost exclusively with the
structure of the federal government, and nothing more.1 Those
seven articles are all that the Framers wrote at Philadelphia, all that
they signed, and all that the proponents-the "Federalists"-pro-
moted. And those seven articles are all that the states ratified when
the people voted to adopt the Constitution of the United States.
We know, of course, that a bill of rights soon followed. But the
Framers, most of them ardent supporters of civil liberty, were
willing to establish a nation under the real possibility that an
enumeration of rights might not follow. "How could such an
'assembly of demigods,' as Jefferson called them, neglect the
liberties of the people?"
2
What if there had been no bill of rights? One might think the
consequences for individual liberty would have been disastrous. But
perhaps the authors of the Constitution trusted that a bill of rights
was not essential to preserve the fundamental aspects of an ordered
liberty. Perhaps they had already made provision for the require-
ments of ordered liberty through the structure of the government
they had crafted in the original Constitution.
The principle of separated powers is a prominent feature of
the body of the Constitution, dictating the form, function, and
structure of a government of limited powers. "Ordered liberty," a
phrase coined by Justice Cardozo,3 has come to represent a
coufnter-majoritarian protection of the rights of the individual
against arbitrary or unfair treatment at the hands of the govern-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. J.D., 1982, Georgetown
University; B.A., 1978, St. John's College. I would like to thank Barry Friedman,
Larry Kramer, Thomas Krattenmaker, Harold Krent, Harold Levinson, Harold Maier,
Thomas McCoy, Alan Morrison, Robert Rasmussen, Nicholas Zeppos, and David
Zolensky for their help in developing the ideas in this Article. I am grateful to
KathleenJustice, Christina Nargolwala, and Peter Paine for their research assistance
and to the Dean's Research Fund for financial support.
1 1 SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISRusT 92 (1980) (pointing out that the original
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' See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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ment, rights now embodied in the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. In the last three decades, the meaning
of "separated powers" and of "ordered liberty" has come under
increasing scrutiny. It is curious, however, that the relationship
between these two core concepts has yet to be explored.4
The Supreme Court has treated separation of powers as an
isolated area of the law, governed by its own glacial dynamic and
insulated from the social changes that stimulate development of
other constitutional doctrines. I reject that approach and, repairing
to the norms that inspired the embrace of the mechanism of
separated powers at its inception, seek to demonstrate that the
structure of the government is a vital part of a constitutional
organism whose final cause is the protection of individual rights.
From this perspective, it is unsurprising that the revolution in
individual rights of the fifties and sixties was followed in the
seventies and eighties by renewed interest and profound changes in
the doctrine of separated powers.
A link between constitutional structure and liberty has been
acknowledged by political philosophers for centuries; many of those
who have favored a system. of separated powers have done so, at
least in part, to promote liberty.5 The importance of the relation-
ship between governmental structure and individual freedom is
borne out by a comparison with authoritarian nations in which the
people actually enjoy comparatively little freedom, despite very
generous verbal constitutional commitments to individual liberties.
Such constitutions contain liberal bills of rights, but they do not
provide for separated powers, 6 so that those who execute the laws
also interpret and enforce them. The value of enumerated rights is
dramatically diminished as a consequence. The Framers of our own
4 One examination of separation of powers under a "rule of law" approach has
explored the importance of avoiding conflicts of interest in government actions,
necessarily touching upon some aspects of due-process jurisprudence. See Verkuil,
Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 301, 303-07 (1989); see also Pierce, Separation of Powers and the Limits of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 365 (1989) (discussing role of conflict of
interest in structural analysis). These discussions, however, do not focus on the
individual-rights concerns which are the essence of due process. See Strauss, Article
III Courts and the Constitutional Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 307, 310 (1990) (suggesting that
courts should interpret structural provisions to maintain protection of rights).
5 See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
6 See KONST. SSSR. ch. 1 (government structure), ch. 7 (rights); see also A.
VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY
SIGNIFICANCE 13-18 (1963) (discussing how lack of separated powers in the Weimar
Republic led to loss of individual rights and rise of Hitler).
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Constitution preferred to err in the opposite direction: once the
body of the Constitution was essentially complete, some opposed
the addition of a bill of rights on the ground that the structure of
the government, with its own self-limiting principles, would make
any express protection of individual liberties superfluous or even
counterproductive.
7
As if to confirm its central importance in protecting individual
rights, the judges and academics who take up the subject of
separated powers almost invariably invoke James Madison: "The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny."8 The brief bow to Madison so often
performed, however, is more a ritualistic gesture than an effort to
supply a meaningful framework for the inquiry at hand. The quoted
passage rarely, if ever, appears to influence the writer's analysis in
any substantive way.
I argue that the Madisonian goal of avoiding tyranny through
the preservation of separated powers should inform the Supreme
Court's analysis in cases raising constitutional issues involving the
7 See THE FEDERAIST No. 84, at 561 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1937)
(contending that a bill of rights is not only unnecessary but dangerous); see also C.
BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 243-53 (1966) (describing the circumstances
surrounding the rejection of a bill of rights at the 1787 Constitutional Convention);
Elliott, Why Our Separation of PowersJurisprudence Is So Abysma, 57 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 506, 511 (1989) (arguing that separation-of-powers theory was considered the
foundation of constitutional law by the Framers); infra notes 112-14 and accompany-
ing text (discussing relationship between lack of a bill of rights and structural
provisions).
8 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (J. Madison) (Modem Library ed. 1937). The
same thought was expressed byThomasJefferson: "[C]oncentrating these [legislative,
executive, and judicial powers] in the same hands is precisely the definition of
despotic government." Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIII, No. 4, reprinted in T.
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 245 (M. Peterson ed. 1984). It was also voiced by Montesquieu:
"There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person, or body of magistrates." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra, at 314 (quoting
Montesquieu).
The quotation from Madison, or language expressing the same idea, can be
found in nearly every modern judicial opinion on the subject of separated powers.
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,380-81 (1989); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714,733-34 (1986); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
859-60 (1986) (Brennan,J., dissenting); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985) (Brennan,J., concurring in judgment); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982).
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structure of government. Moreover, that goal should be understood
as a concern for protecting individual rights against encroachment
by a tyrannical majority. Madison's insight expresses a fundamental
due-process concern that can supply the consistent interpretative
philosophy heretofore missing from the Court's constitutional
analysis of separation of powers. The protection of individual
rights-specifically, evenhanded treatment by the government, or
"ordered liberty'-should be an explicit factor in the analysis of
structural issues and should provide an animating principle for the
jurisprudence of separated powers.9 Thus, as I explain in greater
detail below, when government action is challenged on separation-
of-powers grounds, the Court should consider the potential effect
of the arrangement on individual due-process interests.
I will show that this "ordered-liberty" model has many virtues.
First, it quite sensibly recognizes that separation of powers is not an
end in itself. In addition, it is consistent with the original under-
standing of the Constitution and the traditions that gave rise to it.
Thus consideration of individual rights in conjunction with
separated powers, while not effecting any dramatic changes in the
results of the Court's cases, will bring a welcome coherence to the
law developing around the body of the Constitution, and, more
importantly, will help to ensure the future balance of government
powers in a changing nation. Finally, this theory provides a rational
structure for articles I, II, and III that also elucidates other areas of
the law, including standing, delegation, and administrative due
process.
I first discuss the current themes in the law of separated powers
and the need for a new approach. I then examine the historical
relationship between the doctrine of separated powers and ordered
liberty. I conclude that government action that jeopardizes
government process poses a concomitant danger to individual rights
and that the potential for such danger should therefore be a
significant factor in separation-of-powers analysis. I show that
concern for the principle of due process has appeared repeatedly in
9 This Article is limited in scope to those separation-of-powers conflicts that end
up before the Judiciary. This class of conflicts is quite small relative to the large
number of situations in which the branches of government routinely contend for,
share, and allocate power without ever going to court. But it is principally the former
class that raises significant issues of legal analysis and theory, the latter being driven
by predominantly customary and political considerations. Whether the theory
espoused here could aid in the resolution of extra-judicial conflicts of separated
powers is a subject for another article.
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the Court's separation-of-powers cases. The Court and individual
justices have attached individual rights implications to structural
analyses in ways that would make no sense were it not for some
unspoken or perhaps even unconscious perception that they belong
there. At the same time, however, the Court has not yet expressly
recognized individual liberty as an important value in resolving
structural issues. I argue that it is such a value, and also show the
importance of the due-process theory to the law of standing, the
nondelegation doctrine, and the separation of functions in adminis-
trative agencies.
. Finally, I examine the major cases involving separated powers
and discuss how my theory would change their constitutional
analyses. Employing the "ordered-liberty" model of separated
powers I set forth would secure for the body of the Constitution the
dignity, intelligibility, and purpose that its historical traditions
suggest.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SEPARATED POWERS
A. The Supreme Court's Ad Hoc Approach.
Unanimity among constitutional scholars is all but unheard of.
Perhaps when achieved it should be celebrated. But one point on
which the literature has spoken virtually in unison is no cause for
celebration: the Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional
separation of powers is an incoherent muddle.
10
10 See e.g., Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-
Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U.L. REV. 719, 721 [hereinafter Carter,
Evolution] (arguing that the Court's reasoning in separation-of-powers cases lacks
analytical coherence); Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105,
127-28 (1988) [hereinafter Carter, Mess] (noting that the Court, by upholdingjudicial
appointment of independent counsel to investigate alleged wrongdoing in the
executive branch in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), sounded a sudden retreat
from traditional separation-of-powers jurisprudence); Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without
a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases,
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1085-86 (1987) (finding no justification for the Burger
Court's inconsistencies); Elliott, supra note 7, at 507 (stating that the Court has failed
to develop a law of separation of powers); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches
to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488,489-
96 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Approaches] (asserting that the Court has adopted
inconsistent reasoning styles); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment
on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 789, 817-18 [hereinafter
Strauss, Veto Decision] (contending that the Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), created confusion regarding constitutional process in regulatory
setting); Verkuil, supra note 4, at 312 (insisting that the Court is searching for "sure
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The criticism here is not the familiar lament that the Court has
gotten it wrong. In the field of separated powers the Court has not
really "gotten it" at all. It has adopted no theory, embraced no
doctrine, endorsed no philosophy, that would provide even a
starting-point for debate. The Court has appeared to decide each
case as if it were the first of its kind, with each individual justice
apparently weighing costs and benefits according to some idiosyn-
cratic scale of values, often unarticulated, and which may vary from
case to case. The decisions reached in this ad hoc manner have not
necessarily been wrong, but neither have they required the Court to
take a stand on what values the structural provisions of the
Constitution should promote. Even if the results of these cases have
not been particularly alarming, the absence of any intelligible
foundation for those results certainly is.
11
The judicial opinions addressing the separation of powers over
the past decade tend to place primary emphasis not on the
prevention of tyranny or protection of individual liberties, but on
the advancement of the institutional interests of the branches
themselves, 12 as if that goal were itself a good-a proposition with
no historical support. When possible excesses by one branch
guide" to separation-of-powers cases); Note, Separation of Powers: A New Look at the
Functionalist Approach, 40 CASE NV. REs. 331, 331 (1989-90) (maintaining that the
Court has used two inconsistent modes of analysis in addressing recent separation-of-
powers issues). But see Stern, The Separation of Powers Cases: Not Really a Mess, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 461,464 (1989) (defending Court's reasoningin its separation-of-powers
jurisprudence).
' Also somewhat alarming is the cynical speculation that the Court's ad hoc
approach masks a more troubling agenda of favoring the Executive over Congress.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 1084. Such speculation seems less plausible as
applied to the Rehnquist Court, which in deciding Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988), employed a functionalist analysis and rejected the Executive's position on the
constitutional issues presented. See infra notes 130-37,218-21 and accompanying text
(discussing Morrison).
12 See Strauss, supra note 4, at 309-10. The seeds of this trend can be seen as early
as 1932 in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The Court distinguished between
the "simpl[e]... question of due process in relation to notice and hearing" and "the
question whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the
judicial power ... is vested, an administrative agency." Id. at 56. The Court
approached the issue from the perspective of the Judicial Branch, seeming to suggest
that as long as its essential attributes were not jeopardized, delegation of judicial
power to non-article III bodies would be constitutionally permissible. See id. at 54.
Other early warning signs of the institutional analysis can be found in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (stating that postmaster's duties are executive in nature;
President must have unrestricted power of removal) and Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (noting that the Federal Trade Commission is neither
"arm" nor "eye" of the Executive and must be free from executive control).
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present issues that cannot be resolved easily by resort to the text of
the Constitution, the Court simply asks whether the territorial
boundaries of the "victim" branch have been violated. The Court's
ultimate goal appears to be to protect the interests of each branch-
its "turf-against encroachment by the others. Hence, the Court
has viewed the separation of powers as "a self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of another."
13
A representative example is Morrison v. Olson,14 in which both
the majority and the dissent took this institutional-interests
approach, disagreeing only on the extent of the turf at stake.
Morrison presented a challenge to the independent counsel scheme
established by Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.15
The Act provided for the appointment, under specified circumstanc-
es, of an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute crimes
when certain high-ranking executive officials came under suspicion.
The statute thus removed those limited prosecutorial functions from
the exclusive control of the President. The appellee, Olson, argued,
among other things, that in doing so the Act violated the principle
of separation of powers. 16 A majority of the Court found no
constitutional violation because the Act did not "pose a 'dange[r] of
congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions.'"
17
Justice Scalia, in a vituperative dissent, thought it obvious that the
statute unlawfully deprived the Executive of exclusive power over
the execution of the laws.1 Both sides appeared to agree that the
Court should be concerned principally with the degree of encroach-
ment upon the "turf" of the Executive Branch. Other cases display
the same distressing inclination.
1 9
13 Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
14 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
15 Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75 (amended by the Ethics in
Government Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039, and the Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988)).
16 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693.
17 Id. at 694 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)).
18 See id. at 708-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19 See infra notes 122-29, 138-62 and accompanying text (discussing institutional-
interests approach taken by the Court in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)).
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This trend marks a disturbing departure from the original
objectives underlying the separation of powers.2 Rather than
reinforcing a governmental design that furthers the public good,
21
the Court's institutional rhetoric suggests an aim of preserving the
government for its own sake. On the whole, the Court's separation-
of-powers decisions have protected the mechanics of government
operations, and while this has often led to correct results, there is
no look beyond any specific case to a higher objective that the
separation of powers may serve. The operation has been a success
thus far, but the patient may be dying.
What the Court has not even pretended to achieve for the body
of the Constitution-fidelity to the document's animating princi-
ples-it has unapologetically sought in its interpretations of the Bill
of Rights. Take the eighth amendment, for example. In determin-
ing whether government action constitutes such "cruel and unusual
punishment" as is barred by that amendment, the Court from the
beginning has turned to Che goals those elusive words might have
been intended to promote. Initially the Court articulated the
philosophy that the words used in the eighth amendment should be
given the same application they had originally. This "historical"
mode led it to invalidate only those actions that would have been
considered "cruel and unusual" in 1789.22 Later, the Court looked
to the Constitution and concluded that the purpose of the amend-
ment was not only to bar procedures condemned in 1789, but also
to prevent novel forms of cruelty.23 This more expansive view of
the eighth amendment's purpose became the standard informing
the Court's resolution of cases arising under it. More recently, the
Court has found that "the Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."24 This is but another interpretative standard,
yet the Court still relies on a vision of the amendment's underlying
goal and spirit in the process of deciding cases.
Thus while the Court's understanding of the eighth amendment
has undergone a series of radical changes over time, and while the
justices clearly make no pretense of agreeing among themselves
2 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
21 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (Modern
Library ed. 1937) ("the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the
public rights").
22 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890).
2 See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-72 (1910).
24 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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regarding the objectives to which the constitutional language
points, 25 the Court has consistently striven to identify those
objectives, referring to them for guidance as a matter of course. Yet
neither the method of constitutional reasoning nor the profound
historical analysis and eloquence of expression which have charac-
terized the Court's eighth amendment decisions have been brought
to bear in its separation-of-powers cases. The same may be said of
the Court's treatment of other individual rights issues,26 leaving
those cases involving the structure of government-those arising
under the body of the Constitution (articles I, 11, and 11)-as
perhaps the only group of cases without an animating spirit.
Admittedly, the tasks are somewhat different. Interpretation of
the Bill of Rights begins with very broad, grand, and often fluid
textual provisions-"freedom of speech," "unreasonable searches and
seizures," "due process of law," "cruel and unusual punishment"-
that are more the embodiment of philosophical aspirations than
specific rules of conduct. The Court must attempt to understand
the nature and contours of such lofty norms before it can give them
meaning in specific factual contexts. In the context of the Bill of
Rights, the Court has taken that obligation quite seriously.
The process of interpreting the structural requirements of the
Constitution works just the other way around. The Constitution
articulates no general principle of separated powers.27 Articles I,
11, and III contain no broad normative phrases at all. Instead they
articulate specific rules for allocating and exercising government
power. 28  From those specifics, the Court must determine the
validity of other specific acts not mentioned in the text-as if the
eighth amendment did not prohibit cruel and unusual punishment
generally, but specifically outlawed thumb screws, decapitation, and
the rack, leaving the Court to decide whether the list should include
25 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (setting forth five different
opinions on why the death penalty violates the eighth amendment and four on why
it does not).
26 See Elliott, supra note 7, at 509-10, 510 n.10 (describing the "splendid
conceptual and rhetorical edifices that judges have constructed under the First
Amendment").
27 See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (explaining that such a provision
was proposed and rejected).
2 See Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminaty
Defense ofan Imperfect Muddk 94 YALE L.J. 821,854 (1985) (explaining the specificity
of the structural provisions). See generally C. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATION-
SHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 3-32 (1969) (advocating a method of interpretation that
takes into account the structure and relationships created by the Constitution).
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electrocution. Unable to reason from specific to specific, the Court
has approached questions arising under articles I, II, and III either
by forcing the issue of the case, often artificially, into terms that
bring it within the express language of one of the specific provi-
sions,29 or by supplying some ad hoc general principle of its
own. a° Under these circumstances, it is easy to lose sight of the
big picture.
B. Critical Approankes: Formalism and Functionalism
The lack of analytic consistency has exasperated the critics.
Most writers in the field have proceeded by selecting the interpreta-
tive theory they consider superior, then evaluating each of the
Court's separation-of-powers decisions against the template of that
theory. Because the Court has failed to adopt its own theory,
invariably some of its opinions pass muster and others do not,
depending upon the perspective of the scholar. Even those
decisions that do correspond in result to the author's recommenda-
tions generally do so for the wrong reasons-again because of the
absence of theoretical foundation.
31
The most prominent theories of constitutional interpretation to
be superimposed upon the separation-of-powers cases by and large
track the traditional "formalist" and "functionalist" approaches to
constitutional interpretation.3 2  Other terminology has been
offered by various scholars, who have staked claims for a "de-
evolutionary" versus an "evolutionary" approach;33 a "neoclassical"
2 See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675-77 (using narrow language of the appoint-
ments dause); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1986) (emphasizing the
Constitution's use of the term "executive").
so Compare Humphrey's Ex'rv. United States, 295 U.S. 602,629 (1935) (describing
"fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of
government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the others") with Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,381 (1989) ("the
greatest security against tyranny... lies not in a hermetic division between the
Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within
each Branch").
31 See Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and
the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 127, 149 (arguing that Chadha reached
right result for wrong reasons).
32 Some advocate a formalist approach to structural issues and a functionalist
approach to interpreting the Bill of Rights. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTrTUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37-60, 91-145 (1982); Carter, supra note 28, at 863-64.
33 See Carter, Evolution, supra note 10, at 719-20. Professor Carter develops two
strands of interpretative theory in separation-of-powers cases. The evolutionary
tradition recognizes the need to defer to Congress in its efforts to adapt the powers
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versus a "pragmatic" approach;3 an "originalist" versus a "non-
originalist" interpretation,3 5 or judicial "literalism" versus judicial
"interpretation."' 6 On closer inspection these theories appear to
present pretty much the same dichotomy, and fit reasonably well
within the general descriptions of the formalist and functionalist
schools.
3 7
Those who espouse the formalist view of separated powers seek
judicial legitimacy by insisting upon a firm textual basis in the
Constitution for any governmental act.38 They posit that the
structural provisions of the Constitution should be understood
solely by their literal language and the drafters' original intent
regarding their application, giving little or no weight to the
influence of changed circumstances or broad objectives such as
good or efficient government.3 9 The formalist approach is com-
of the federal government to changing needs. The de-evolutionary tradition rejects
these evolutionary tendencies and urges a return to the Framers' original design. See
id.
34 See Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 41, 52. Professor Miller
describes the pragmatic view, dominant on the Court between the 1930s and the
1970s, as endorsing a practical, flexible approach, "such that the division of powers
between the branches, and the system of checks and balances by which those powers
are related to one another, can... stretch[]... to accommodate the changing needs
of modern society." Id. In contrast, the neoclassical view "de-emphasizes the
imliortance of convenience and efficiency," and "emphasizes instead the 'constitution-
al design for the separation of powers' and the 'structure of the articles delegating
and separating powers.'" Id. at 53-54 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946
(1983)).
" See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204, 205-24 (1980) (cataloguing the meanings of originalism).
6 See Elliott, supra note 10, at 509. Professor Elliott describes literalism as a
"negative," "simplistic," "even slavish obeisance to the Framers' intentions on the
specifics of governmental organization and structure." Id. at 511. Interpretation, in
contrast, "asks not only what the Framers did, but also why." Id. at 532. See also Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1975) (noting that
former Justice Black's literalist approach to constitutional adjudication may be
returning to favor).37 See Carter, Mess, supra note 10, at 109 n.11 (arguing that differences are
principally in emphasis). My description of the two schools will necessarily be
inadequate because of its generality and brevity. With apologies to those whose views
I have given short shrift, I emphasize that this discussion is primarily for illustration
and contrast, and does not play a substantive role in the theory I am setting forth in
this Article.
3 See Carter, supra note 28, at 855; Carter, Mess, supra note 10, at 106.
39 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59 ("it is crystal dear... that the Framers ranked
other values higher than efficiency"); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986)
("'[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution.'" (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944)).
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mitted to strong substantive separations between the branches of
government,4' finding support in the traditional expositions of the
theme of "pure" separated powers, such as the maxim that "the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary
construes the law."41 Thus the formalists attempt to ensure that
exercise of governmental power comports strictly with the original
blueprint laid down in articles I, II, and III of the Constitution.
42
Under formalist thinking, the creation of independent administra-
tive agencies, for example, is considered a violation of the Constitu-
tion because such agencies require the exercise of governmental
power in ways that involve an overlap of expressly assigned
functions, subject to the control of none of the three branches.
43
The implications and consequences of formalism are significant.
First, it depends upon a belief that legislative, executive, and judicial
powers are inherently distinguishable as well as separable from one
another-a highly questionable premise. 44  Moreover, formalism
40 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 ("'The fundamental necessity of maintaining each
of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed
and is hardly open to serious question'" (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935))).
41 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
42 See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Framers of the
Federal Constitution similarly viewed the principle of separation of powers as the
absolutely central guarantee of ajust government"); Krent, Separating the Strands in
Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253,1261-72 (1988) (discussing how
constitutional restraints on each branch of government act as self-executing
mechanisms for minimizing interbranch conflict).
43 See Bruff, Presidential Pomr and Administrative Rulemaking 88 YALE L.J. 451,
498-99 (1979); Miller, supra note 34, at 54-55.
44 In his dissent in Morrison, for example, Justice Scalia admitted of "no possible
doubt" that "prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function." 487 U.S.
at 706. Yet several historically-based analyses of that question have reached a
different conclusion. See e.g., Carter, Meas supra note 10, at 126 (discussing dual
system of public and private prosecution in colonial America); Gwyn, The Indetermina-
cy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 474, 489
(1989) (arguing thatJustice Scalia is unaware of historical evidence); Krent, Executive
Control Over Criminal Law Enfonrement: Some Lessons From Histo, 38 AM. U.L. REV.
275, 281 (1989) (disputingjustice Scalia's conclusion that criminal law enforcement
is a core executive function). Even for Madison, rigid categorization of functions as
executive, legislative, or judicial was impossible and unreliable. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 37, at 228 (J. Madison) (Modern Library ed. 1937) ("Experience has instructed
us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and
define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive and
judiciary"). See also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes
and Brandeis, Ji., dissenting) ("we do not and cannot carry out the distinction
between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments"); Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About
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tends to produce excessively mechanical results. Two of the Court's
most clearly formalist opinions-INS v. Chadha,45 which struck
down the legislative veto, and Bowsher v. Synar,46 which invalidated
provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that vested budget-
cutting authority in the Comptroller Genera147--have been criti-
cized on that ground.48 This is not to say that the formalists are
unconcerned with the results of their analysis. Indeed, they often
justify their approach by insisting that rigid adherence to the strict
constitutional design is the only, or at least the best, way to ensure
that liberty survives. 49 But the means has become too important
and the end not important enough to the formalist school, so that
the "forest" of individual liberty is often lost in the "trees" of
absolute fealty to the Framers' words. "To insist upon the mainte-
nance of an absolute separation merely for the sake of doctrinal
purity could severely hinder the quest for 'a workable government'
with no appreciable gain for the cause of liberty or efficiency."
50
Moreover, formalism, at least as promoted by Justice Scalia,
appears to be concerned primarily with forcing the Court to adhere
to bright-line rules to foster predictability and restraint in judg-
ing.51 Thus, the particular choice of rules-and the attendant goals
of each chosen rule-are secondary, and the liberty that separation
Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 437-38 (1987)
(noting that distinctions among various branches have been called into question).
45 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
46 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
47 Both Chadha and Bowsher are discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes
148-62 and accompanying text.
4 See L. FISHER, CONsTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 179-81 (1985); Elliot, supra note 31, at 144-45; Gewirtz, Realism in
Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1989); Kurland,
The Rise and Fall of the 'Doctrine* of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 592-93,
605-13 (1986); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 633-36 (1984); Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After the New Dea4 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494 (1987); Tribe, The Legislative Veto
Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8-18 (1984).
49 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 710-11 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (arguing that
separation of powers operates to "ensure that we do not lose liberty"); Chadha, 462
U.S. at 959 ("we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making
the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution").
5 Alfange, The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to
Normalcy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 670 (1990).
51 See, e.g., Zeppos,Justice Scalia's Textualism: The New "New Legal Process, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming); Zeppos, Legislative Histoiy and the Interpretation of
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1354-55 (1990).
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of powers theoretically protects may be sacrificed in a given case to
the principal objective of determinacy in judicial decisionmaking.
An additional consequence of formalism is that it tends to
straitjacket the government's ability to respond to new needs in
creative ways, even if those ways pose no threat to whatever might
be posited as the basic purposes of the constitutional structure.
52
And ironically, in light of the usual textualist support for judicial
restraint, the Court is forced to engage in a relatively high degree
of judicial activism. Formalism, although conceiving a narrow role
for the Court, forces it to strike down any action for which it cannot
find express textual justification in the Constitution, even when two
branches of the federal government may have agreed or acquiesced
in the use of certain powers.
Finally, formalism supports majoritarianism. It is no accident
that many of those who advocate the formalist view of constitutional
interpretation for separation-of-powers issues also strongly favor
greater strength for the Executive Branch-a majoritarian institu-
tion-through a "unitary" theory of executive power.53 Formalism
restricts innovation in sharing power and encourages independence
of the branches; in the modern era it has most often been Congress,
as the instigator of political change through legislation, that has
initiated new modes of allocating or sharing power, at least in the
domestic sphere. Thus, the formalist view as understood by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts has tended to work to restrict
Congress to the advantage of the Executive.54 In the area of
52 See, e.g., Gwyn, supra note 44, at 474-75 (contrasting the flexibility of the
functionalist orientation with the rigidity of the formalist approach); Strauss, supra
note 48, at 625-26 (criticizing preference of formalists for bright-line rules).
5' T'le unitary executive contemplates a centralized and coordinated Executive
Branch in which the President hat unfettered control over any officer who can be said
to exercise executive power. This scheme is the focus of much formalist writing. See,
e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 698-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Framers
consciously declined to weaken the Executive by dividing it); Carter, Mess, supra note
10, at 112 (noting that once a function is viewed as "executive," formalist approach
would give President complete control over it); Miller, supra note 34, at 54-56
(advocating formalist approach in part on the ground that it promotes the unitary
executive). See generally Cross, The Surviving Significance of the Unitay Executive, 27
HOUsTON L. REv. 599, 618-57 (1990) (arguing that the unitary executive is an
important but not absolute constitutional principle); Pierce, The Role of the Judicialy
in Implementing an Agency Theoij of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1251-54
(1989) (offering a functional defense of the unitary executive).
54 Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (striking down Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act on formalist theory) and Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 958-59 (striking down legislative veto on formalist theory) with Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding Sentencing Act by rejecting formalist
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foreign affairs, where the Executive traditionally has enjoyed more
freedom to initiate policy, formalism would tend to work against the
Executive Branch and in favor of Congress, also a majoritarian
institution, in the same fashion.55 Either way, however, formalism
resists efforts to blend the areas of turf between Congress and the
Executive; it promotes the passage of legislation and the execution
of the laws strictly in the manner set forth in the Constitution. It
thus ensures that the majoritarian political outcomes contemplated
by the procedures outlined in articles Iand II will not be compro-
mised.- 6
In contrast, advocates of the "functionalist" approach urge the
Court to ask a different question: whether an action of one branch
interferes with one of the core functions of another.57 The
sharing of powers, in itself, is not repugnant to the functionalists,
nor is the formation of alliances among the branches repugnant, as
long as the basic principles of separated powers are not im-
paired.58 The functionalist view follows a different strand of
argument) and Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-96 (upholding Ethics in Government Act by
rejecting formalist argument).
55 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). When
President Truman attempted to seize the steel mills under his powers as Commander-
in-Chief, to secure the steel supply for use in the Korean conflict, the Court employed
a formalist analysis in finding his action unconstitutional. It found that none of the
President's express article II powers, read narrowly, permitted such an action in the
absence of legislative authorization. See id. at 588-89. Similarly, a formalist approach
in the case of Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), would have produced
a decision against the President. There, the Court-using functionalist and not
formalist analysis-upheld President Carter's executive agreement with Iran against
a challenge that the Constitution does not authorize such executive agreements, but
only treaties, which require ratification by the Senate. See id. at 686. A formalist
treatment of the issue almost certainly would have produced the opposite result.
M Chadha is an example of the Court's insisting that action be taken by a
majoritarian procedure-bicameral passage and presentment to the President-rather
than by the less accountable committee or one-house action. Similarly, Bowsher
prevented an attempt to allow action by a single person, the Comptroller General,
who possessed the accountability of neither the entire Congress nor the President.
By requiring that Congress as a whole perform the duties that the statute vested in
the Comptroller General, the Court ensured that the powers so assigned would be
exercised in ways acceptable to the majority. See infra notes 148-62 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Chadha and Bowsher).
57 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he role of this Court
should be limited to determining whether the [act in issue] so alters the balance of
authority among the branches of government as to pose a genuine threat to the basic
division between the lawmaking power and the power to execute the law."); see also
Nixon v. GSA, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (holding that separation-of-powers analysis
must focus on the potential disruption of the balance of power among the coordinate
branches of government).
58 See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 44, at 433 (noting the functionalists' recognition
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separation-of-powers tradition from that of the formalists: the
American variant that stresses not the independence, but the
interdependence of the branches. "While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.
59
Functionalism appears to bestow on judges a much greater
discretion than does formalism. In order for the functionalist
system to work, someone must determine what values or functions
are central to the constitutional structure, and must define the
extent to which changed circumstances should be permitted to
influence that determination. 6° Functionalist analysis is criticized,
therefore, for its indeterminacy and the inevitability of ad hoc
decisionmaking under its influence.6 1  In reality, however, the
deference contemplated by functionalism has resulted in a less
activist role for the Judiciary than has formalism-or at least it
fosters activism of a different kind. While formalism nearly always
results in striking down the challenged measure,62 functionalism
nearly always upholds it. 63 The activism of functionalism resides
in the unguided discretion that it necessarily bestows on judges.
The functionalist approach, like the formalist, is majoritarian in
outcome. Because it encourages cooperation among branches, it
of the complex interaction among the various institutions of government).
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
60 See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 494-96. It is not clear what principles the Court
is expected to employ in making these delicate determinations. "[T]hejudge is left
... to work out in every case whether the power that one branch has appropriated
is too great, or whether the checks now available over another are too small,... a
slender reed indeed to support a jurisprudence of separation of powers.' Carter,
Evolution, supra note 10, at 787.
61 See Carter, Constitutional Improprietis: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and
Administrative Government 57 U. CH. L. REv. 357, 375-76 (1990).
62 See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (rejecting as unconstitutional provisions of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (striking down the legislative
veto); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(rejecting as unconstitutional provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978); Youngstown
Sheet 343 U.S. 579 (blocking executive order directing Secretary of Commerce to
seize steel mills); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that Senate
cannot block President's removing an executive officer).
63 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding power of
U.S. Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding
appointment of independent counsel); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding provisions of Commodities Exchange Act).
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would likely permit schemes to which Congress and the Executive,
the two majoritarian branches, give their assent. Thus it is a theory
that employs the principle of judicial restraint,64 and relies largely
upon the departments of government themselves to work out what
is best for them politically. This approach pays little attention to
the effects of such inter-institutional alliances on those outside the
government, namely private individuals. Within certain limits (and
it is not clear exactly where those limits lie) the structure of
government for the functionalists becomes a matter of politics,
because the Court's deferential approach leaves the bulk of the
responsibility for structural design to the elected departments of
government.
An alternative to these two mechanisms for resolving separation-
of-powers issues would leave all disputes between the Executive and
Congress to the political process and rule them non-justiciable
political questions.6 5 The justification for this approach is that the
branches are capable of protecting themselves, through the weapons
provided them in the Constitution in the form of "checks and
balances," against encroachments by the others. It is not at all clear,
however, that such protection is possible.' Moreover, even if true
balance could be achieved through judicial deference to the political
branches, this would be insufficient to justify such deference: the
Constitution envisages that the Judiciary will protect not the
branches of government, but individuals. 67  Shielding the actions
of the political branches from review invites them, through partisan
allegiances or other institutional imbalance, to seek their own ends,
to the ultimate detriment of individual rights.6"
64 See Carter, Evolution, supra note 10, at 725.
65 See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263
(1980). This idea was earlier expressed by Justice Holmes in Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (dissenting opinion). It appears also to be the Court's
current approach to issues of power-sharing between Congress and the states. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1985) (leaving
protection of state sovereignty to political process because structure of federal
government was designed to prevent congressional overreaching).
66 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 21, at 338 ("But it is not possible to give
to each department an equal power of self-defence.").67 See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
6 See generally, Alexander, Separation of Powers After the Independent Counsel
Decision, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 1 (1989) ("[T]he Supreme Court should decline
to hear cases presenting separation-of-powers issues in favor of allowing one of the
other two branches of government to resolve them."); Sunstein, supra note 48, at 495
("There is good reason to suppose that without adequate controls one branch will
sometimes exercise too much power over the others.").
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Thus the scholarly debate about separated powers has been
polarized, for the most part, between the formalists and the
functionalists-a battle between those who would pay the price of
rigidity in order to achieve an elusive determinacy on the one
hand, 9 and those who would pay the price of indeterminacy in
order to achieve unguided flexibility on the other.70 This debate
goes wrong because it hangs in midair, moored to no grander
objective than the abstract merits of the two relatively mechanical
theories themselves-in the end no more than a question of where
the proper point lies on the flexibility/determinacy matrix.
Missing from the analysis of both camps is an appropriate
external value. By "appropriate," I mean a norm that is consistent
with the reasons for separating powers in the first place. Few seem
to be asking which (or what) approach to constitutional analysis-
formalist, functionalist, or some other-will serve more reliably the
underlying purposes of the constitutional provisions being interpret-
ed. The formalists appear to assume that textualism brings
legitimacy. And although the functionalists fairly lay claim to a
concern for the Constitution's basic structural principles of "unitary
execution of the laws, avoidance of factionalism, protection against
self-interested or unaccountable representation, and promotion of
deliberation in government," 71 those goals address making govern-
ment work, not toward what ends a government should work. By
fostering a majoritarian approach to the achievement of these goals,
the functionalists, too, overlook a fundamental element of the
Constitution's plan for liberty: the need to place limits on what a
majority may do to the individual.72 Although the Bill of Rights
69 See Carter, supra note 61, at 357.
70 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (White, J., dissenting) (deploring
"the Court's willingness to interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of
powers as a bar to the attainment of governmental objectives").
71 Sunstein, supra note 48, at 495-96.
72 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to ThomasJefferson (October 17, 1788),
reprinted in 1 L. POLLAK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 122 (1966):
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended,
not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but
from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major
number of the Constituents.
A similar expression of this concern can be found in The Federalist:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against
the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the
injustice of the other part.... If a majority be united by a common
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expressly serves that function in its own way, a comprehensive
approach to overseeing the separated powers must also include the
consideration of individual rights or sacrifice fidelity to the Framers'
plan.
73
A counter-majoritarian approach better addresses the underlying
purposes of separated powers. Unlike both the formalist and
functionalist schools, an "ordered-liberty" analysis would have the
Court examine governmental acts in light of the degree to which
they may tend to detract from fairness and accountability in the
process of government. If process is impaired in this way, then the
action poses a threat to individual liberty. The degree to which one
branch may invade the institutional turf of another is irrelevant, as
is the presence or absence of interbranch agreement to share turf.
In either case, the Court should evaluate the potential effect of the
action on the procedural rights of individuals. Interpreting the
original body of the Constitution itself as containing such an
inherent check on majority action effectuates a major tenet of the
Framers.
II. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORDERED LIBERTY
AND SEPARATED POWERS
The American Constitution does not mention a "doctrine" of
separation of powers. There is no constitutional rule to be
interpreted, no fixed or pure principle to employ that dictates the
segregation of government functions. To the extent that such an
explicit doctrine of absolute separation ever existed, the Framers re-
jected it.74 The best evidence that the Framers intended to reject
a strict separation of powers is that they created a system of checks
and balances requiring participation by each branch in some
functions that may be considered part of the power of the others-
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 21, at 339 (A. Hamilton orJ. Madison).
73 See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRAcY IN AMERICA 246 & n.1 (J.P. Mayer ed.
1969) (noting that the Framers sought to limit "absolute sovereignty of the will of the
majority"); Carter, supra note 61, at 385 (arguing that "putting the brakes on majority
rule is precisely what a written Constitution is for" (citing A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-21 (1986))); Morrison, A Non-Power Looks at Separation of
Powers, 79 GEo. L.J. 281,282 (1990) (suggesting that "the Framers included separation
of powers in the Constitution to protect all of the people").74 See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussingrejection ofMadison's
amendment, which would have incorporated the separation-of-powers principle into
the text of the Constitution).
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itself a violation of a pure theory of separated powers. 75 "Checks
and balances do not arise from separation theory, but are at odds
with it. Checks and balances have to do with corrective invasion of
the separated powers." 76 It is worth remembering that the federal-
ist defense of the Constitution's treatment of governmental
structure focused not on the use of the separation device, but on
the Constitution's numerous deviations from the pure separation
model.
77
We do know that the idea of identifying the functions of
government as separable concepts, familiar to philosophers as early
as Aristotle,78 and that of reposing those functions in separate
hands did not spring full-blown from the collective mind gathered
at Philadelphia in 1787. Since the middle of the seventeenth
century, the separation of' executive, legislative, and, to a lesser
extent, judicial79 powers had been an increasingly popular focus
75 For example, the Executive participates in legislation through the veto power.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cd. 3. The Congress participates in the making of treaties and
the appointment of executive officers through Senate advice and consent. See id., art.
I1, § 2, cl. 2. And both the Executive and the Congress participate in the exercise of
judicial power through their power to enact legislation regarding the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. See id., art. III, § 1 & § 2, cd. 2.
76 G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 119 (1981).
77 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 8, at 312 (responding to the "principal
objection[]" that the Constitution violated the maxim that "the legislative, executive,
and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct" by showing that in
practice this maxim was nowhere regarded as requiring absolute separation); THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (J. Madison) (Modern Library ed. 1937) (undertaking "to
show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation... essential
to a free government can never in practice be duly maintained"); THE FEDERALIST No.
51, supra note 21, at 336 (arguing that "some deviations" from principle of pure
separation "must be admitted").
78 Aristotle described the three elements of a constitution as, first, that "which
deliberates about public affairs"; second, that element "concerned with the
magistracies--the questions being, what they should be, over what they should exercise
authority, and what should be the mode of electing to them"; and third, "that which
has judicial power." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. IV, ch. 14, reprinted in BASIC WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE 1225 (R. McKeon ed. 1970). Although this division roughly
corresponds to modern notions of legislative, executive, andjudicial powers, it is clear
that Aristotle did not go so far as to advocate that the performance of those functions
be kept separate. See, e.g., id. at bk. IV, ch. 15, reprinted in BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE at 1229 ('There is no reason why the care of many offices should not be
imposed on the same person, for they will not interfere with each other. When the
population is small, offices should be like the spits which also serve to hold a lamp.").
79 For the early separation-of-powers theorists, the power to judge was considered
part of the executive power. SeeJ. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 73 (J.
Gough ed. 1976); T. PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, 207-31 (H. Collins ed. 1976). Indeed,
even Montesquieu, who made the great innovative contribution of treating the
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of attention among political theorists.80 Over time, these theorists
developed many variations on the basic separation-of-powers
doctrine, 81 yet no single approach had succeeded in commanding
universal accord.82  One common thread, however, appeared:
"From their inception most versions of the separation of powers
maintained that the arrangement was a prerequisite for civil liberty,
a condition of life for which England had long been famous."
83
On the American side of the Atlantic the primary impetus for
separated powers was the establishment and maintenance of
political liberty. There was perhaps a secondary concern for greater
efficiency in government," but clearly "[t]he doctrine of the
Judiciary as an independent force in government, seemed to treat it somewhat
differently from the other two, using the term "la puissance dejuger" (the ability to
judge) consistently in his writings, rather than "lepouvoirjudiciaire" (judicial power),
in contrast to "ks pouvoir executif ou legislatif" (executive or legislative power). See M.
VILE, CONSTrrUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 87 n.1 (1967).
" These include Buchanan, Nedham, Lilburne, Sir Henry Vane, John Hall,
Pennington, Locke, Hay, Bolingbroke, Pitt, Montesquieu,John Adams, Rousseau, and
de Lolme. See generally W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
(1965) (describing development of the doctrine in political theory up through
adoption of the Constitution); see alsoJ.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 60 (G. Himmelfarb ed.
1978) (arguing that constitutional checks on government power are a necessary
condition to liberty); M. VILE, supra note 79, at 86-87 (discussing the classification of
government functions in Montesquieu and Locke).
s For example, the separation of powers in 17th- and l8th-century Europe had
five possible objectives:
(1) to create greater governmental efficiency; (2) to assure that statutory law
is made in the common interest; (3) to assure that the law is impartially
administered and that all administrators are under the law; (4) to allow the
people's representatives to call executive officials to account for the abuse
of their power; and (5) to establish a balance of governmental powers.
W. GWYN, supra note 80, at 127-28. It is clear that "[a]ll but the efficiency version are
directly concerned with the maintenance of civil liberty and the avoidance of tyranny."
Id. at 128.
82 Many combined the notion of mixed government, which focused on ensuring
that different classes of people were duly represented (as exemplified by the British
House of Commons and House of Lords), with that of separation of powers, which
involved a more functional examination of government that was not concerned with
who performed various functions as long as they were not combined in the same
person. The American idea of dissolving classes and allowing the "people" collectively
to wield all power-combined with deteriorating relations with England-theoretically
eliminated the need for any accommodation of the mixed government ideals in the
Constitution. See M. VILE, supra note 79, at 124-26.
83 W. GWYN, supra note 80, at 11.
84 Experience with the ineffectual Continental Congress contributed to a concern
among the Framers for a more effective government. See e.g., J. ADAMS, 4 WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMs 488, 582 (C.F. Adams ed. 1851) (arguing that checks and balances are
needed to temper the Executive Branch); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward
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separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power." 85 In general, then, separation of powers aimed at the
interconnected goals of preventing tyranny and protecting liber-
tyY86 Of course, different writers have defended different notions
of what those terms meant, but it is not inaccurate to define tyranny
as fear of "arbitrary government."8 7 A short definition of political
liberty is a bit more difficult to come by. Montesquieu, generally
regarded as a principal philosophical progenitor of the American
system of separated powers,8 defined "[t]he political liberty of the
subject" as "a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each
person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty," he asserted,
"it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need
not be afraid of another.' 89 Thus, whatever else we might say,
liberty depends on some notion of predictability, or perhaps
rationality, in government as a basic prerequisite to fair decision-
making.
Carrington (Aug. 4,1787) reprinted in T.JEFFERSON, MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND
MISCELLANIES 202-03 (T.J. Randolph ed. 1829) (suggesting that executive and
legislative functions should be separated for more efficient government). Yet that
concern is more an argument for creating an executive capable of acting quickly and
efficiently than for maintaining strict separation among the branches. Both Adams
and Jefferson recognized that the prevention of tyranny was the chief argument in
favor of the separated powers. See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The
Separation ofPower," 2 U. Cm. L. REV. 385,396-97,400 (1935) (noting that protection
from tyranny was Adams' primary argument for separation of powers and that
Jefferson was concerned that private property be protected from legislative
overreaching); see alsoJ. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 197 (1987) (stating that separation of powers is "indispensable to public
liberty").
85 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8 See W. BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN HISTORY, IN
THEORY, AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS 13-14 (1967) (noting that Montesquieu was the
first to assert that separation of powers is crucial to civil liberty, a proposition with
which Blackstone agreed); P. CONKIN, SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: BEING A DISCOURSE ON
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT-POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND BALANCE AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS (1974) (noting that the notion that government balance protected liberty was
an ancient tenet); SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 15 (B.
Knight ed. 1989) (arguing that it is the distinctly American separation of powers
permitting each branch to have "'self-interest rightly understood' that prevents
majority tyranny and enhances liberty").
87 W. GWYN, supra note 80, at 57.
88 See THE FEDERAIST No. 47, supra note 8, at 313-314; P. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU
IN AMERICA, 1760-1801, at 255 (1969); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1986).
9 C. MONTESQUiEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (T. Nugent trans. 1949); see also
id. at 149.
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Montesquieu elaborated elsewhere upon what would be lost if
the separation of powers was not observed:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not
separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with
the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were
it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or.
the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise
those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the
public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.0 °
From a modern perspective, what Montesquieu described as a
structural problem translates easily into the concept of due process.
For example, twentieth-century due process prevents a court from
retroactively expanding the reach of certain laws,9" which ensures
separation of legislative and judicial functions-a concern Montes-
quieu identifies. Due process also guarantees trial by independent
tribunal,9 2 which ensures the separation of executive and judicial
functions-another of Montesquieu's stated goals. Thus, it is fair to
say that, for Montesquieu, the unification or combination of the
institutional powers would mean the loss of the values that now
underlie the protections of due process.
Montesquieu was by no means alone in this perception:
If a Parliament should execute the Law they might doe palpable
injustice, and male administer it, and so the people would be rob'd
of their intended and extraordinary benefit of appeales; for in
such cases they must appeale to Parliament either against it self,
or part of it self; and can it ever be imagined they will ever
condemme themselves, or punish themselves?9"
Again, the author's description of the evils of consolidated power
presages a basic due-process tenet: the importance of an opportuni-
ty for independent review.94 John Locke is credited with the same
90 Id. at 151-52 (emphasis added).
91 See Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964).
92 See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1950).
9s Lilburne, The Picture of the Councel of State, in LEVELLR TRACTS 197 (W. Haller
& G. Davies eds. 1944), quoted in W. GwYN, supra note 80, at 42.
4 See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920).
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insight, criticizing "absolute monarchies, which, by violating the
separation of powers, frustrate the possibility of achieving an
impartial administration of the laws" 95 -another danger coexten-
sive with the breakdown of due process of law.
96
Montesquieu articulated other potential hazards that separation
of powers was thought to forestall. He saw the exercise of judicial
power as posing the greatest threat to the liberty of the people. He
recognized that the legislature and executive are concerned with
general rules, which might be good or bad for the masses. A
genuine loss of liberty, however, could come only from a judicial
decision, which determines how the laws affect individuals under
specific circumstances. 97 Consequently, Montesquieu emphasized
the importance of judicial procedures, even when costly or
cumbersome, as a protection for the individual from this type of
harm-as a guarantor of "liberty."98  "This insistence upon 'due
process', a phrase Montesquieu does not use but which ... was
current in seventeenth-century England, is of the essence of the
doctrine of constitutionalism, in the development of which his
thought forms such an important step. "99 Thus Montesquieu, for
whom separated powers was essential to liberty, contended that fair
process was similarly essential, suggesting a syllogistic link between
the structure of government and the protection of individual rights-
specifically, the right to fair treatment by the government, or
ordered liberty.
The Constitution adheres to this principle of structural
protection for individuals even more rigorously, in some ways, than
Montesquieu would have done. Montesquieu tolerated one
exception to the ordinary separation between legislative and judicial
powers. He viewed the British Parliament's ability to pass bills of
attainder (legislative declarations of guilt and punishment of
individuals) as a necessary, single instance in which a branch other
than the Judiciary should be permitted to make a decision affecting
95 W. GwYN, supra note 80, at 71.
" See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (stating that due process is
violated when a defendant's "liberty or property [is subjected] to the judgment of a
court the judge of which has a direct personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in
reaching a decision against him").
97 See W. GWYN, supra note 80, at 103; M. VILE, supra note 79, at 88. See also A.
BIcKEL, supra note 73, at 16-23 (arguing thatjudicial review involves construing the
Constitution against the wishes of the majority).
98 See M. VILE, supra note 79, at 89-90.
9Id. at 90.
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the liberty of an individual. "In countries where liberty is most
esteemed, there are laws by which a single person is deprived of it,
in order to preserve it for the whole community." 1°° The United
States Constitution, on the other hand, expressly prohibits this
particular departure from the principle of separated powers,
10 1
which has significant, direct consequences for individual rights, even
though it permits, through checks and balances, other ways of
blending powers that do not so clearly affect individuals. Thus the
constitutional structure is consistent with a philosophy of permitting
deviations from separated powers only when they do not jeopardize
civil liberty.
10 2
The Declaration of Independence confirms that the Framers
perceived a correlation between structure and rights. That
document purported to contain a list of ways in which the King of
England had transgressed the colonists' understanding of appropri-
ate rule, and also documented some of the consequences that had
flowed from the monarch's usurpations of the Americans' liberty.
Among these were the following:
-He [the King] has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome
& necessary for the public good....
- He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public
records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance
with his measures....
- He has obstructed the administration of justice by refusing his
assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.
- He has made ... judges dependent on his will alone .... 10s
Thus, the King had interfered in and commingled the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of the government-exercising
unbridled discretion-and consequently had caused massive
"invasions on the rights of the people."1°4 "A prince whose
character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant is
100 C. MONTESQUEEU, supra note 89, at 199.
101 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (Bill of Attainder Clause).
102 It is noteworthy that the Executive's only constitutionally sanctioned power to
act in individual cases-the pardon power--can serve only to benefit, not to punish
individuals. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
1
0
3 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (US. 1776), reprinted in T.JEFFERSON,
supra note 8, at 20.
104 Id.
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unfit to be the ruler of a free people ... "105 The Framers'
recent experience taught them that abandonment of separated
powers led directly to the loss of accountable, impartial government,
which, in turn, led inevitably to the loss of due process and
individual rights. The Constitution they wrote responded to this
experience.
At the time the Framers met in 1787, the original states already
had constitutions of their own. With regard to the establishment of
the three departments of government in particular, the Framers
were clearly influenced by the experiences of the various states.
1
0
6
The Constitutions of the states of Maryland, 10 7 Massachu-
setts,1 08 New Hampshire, 1°9 North Carolina,110  and Virgin-
ia"' all contained statements explicitly addressing a "separation
of powers." Indeed, that principle actually appears in the bill of
rights sections of those five state constitutions. Thus the idea that
the separation of powers is inextricably linked to the protection of
guaranteed rights finds support in the historical practice most
immediately familiar to those who drafted the federal Constitution.
It is not clear why the Constitution did not provide an express
guarantee of separated powers. 112  The structural provisions
contained in articles I, H and III, in addition to the few expressly
declared rights that appear in the Constitution proper, 113 togeth-
er would have provided the protection of individual rights that all
agreed was imperative. As Alexander Hamilton protested in
defense of the original Constitution without a bill of rights, it "is
itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL
OF RIGHTS."
114
'05 Id. at 22.
106 See THE FEDERAuST No. 47, supra note 8, at 316-20.
10 7 See 3 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTrrUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS 1492-1908,
at 1687 (K.N. Thorpe ed. 1906) (MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, & C., art. VI
(1776)).
10s See id. at 1893 (MASs. CONST., A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, art. XXX (1780)).
109 See 4 id. at 2457 (N.H. CON., The Bill of Rights, art. XXXVII (1784)).
l10 See 5 id. at 2787 (N.C. CONST., A Declaration of Rights, & C., art. IV (1776)).
"I See 7 id. at 3813 (VA. CONST., Bill of Rights, § 5 (1776)).
112 See Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Som Early Versions and Practices,
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 222 (1989).
113 These include the provision governing impeachment, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,
cl. 7; suspension of habeas corpus, art. I, § 9, cl. 2; bills of attainder and expostfacto
laws, art. I, § 9, cl. 3; titles of nobility, art. I, § 9, cl. 8; trial by jury in criminal cases,
art. III, § 2, c. 3; and treason, art. III, § 3.
114 THE FEDERAuST No. 84, supra note 7, at 561.
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James Madison actually proposed in 1789 that a new article be
added to the original Constitution, articulating the American
version of the separation-of-powers principle:
The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the
legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the
executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the powers vested
in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the powers
vested in the legislative or executive departments. 15
The amendment was adopted by the House,116 but defeated by
the Senate.1 17  Later, in the ratifying conventions, a similar
amendment that would have joined the Bill of Rights as part of the
tenth amendment was also rejected.'
The Framers' French contemporaries also regarded separation
of powers as an indispensable correlative of fundamental rights.
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 eloquently
affirmed that "[a] society in which the guarantee of rights is not
assured, nor the separation of powers provided for, has no
constitution."
119
These circumstances provide powerful historical instruction to
those interpreting the Constitution to consider the protection of
individual rights as a guiding principle in issues involving separated
powers. Thus as a general goal of constitutional interpretation, the
Court should set for itself the object of applying the structural
provisions found in articles I, II and III so as to ensure that,
whatever experiments the branches make with the allocation of
governmental power, flexibility or inflexibility will be tolerated only
to the extent that it is consistent with the protection of individual
liberty-due process of law.
115 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 202 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1979).
See E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 36-39 (1957)
(discussing Madison's proposed amendments).
116 See E. DUMBAULD, supra note 115, at 216.
117 See 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1123,
1146, 1150 (1971). It is not clear why the Senate rejected the amendment.
According to Provost Casper, "[o]ne can only surmise that the Senate was not eager
to adopt separation of powers as an independent doctrine or even as a mere principle
of construction for the many and subtle 'mixing' decisions of the framers, some of
which benefitted the Senate." Casper, supra note 112, at 222.
118 See Fisher, The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers, 5 J. AM. STUD. 113, 129-31
(1971).
"9J. GODECHOT, LES CONSTrrTONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, at 35 (1970).
1991] 1539
1540 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 139:1513
The question in a given case, then, is not whether a particular
action by one branch has impaired "[t]he fundamental necessity of
maintaining each of the three general departments of government
entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or
indirect, of either of the others," 120 as the formalists would have
it. Nor is it whether the challenged act "so alters the balance of
authority among the branches of government as to pose a genuine
threat to the basic division between the lawmaking power and the
power to execute the law,"121 as the functionalists would ask the
question. Rather, the Court should ask whether the governmental
action at issue poses a threat to the impartial, non-arbitrary
administration of the law that principles of due process require.
This inquiry is not limited to opportunities to enforce actual rights
of litigants with standing to seek judicial redress; it encompasses a
much broader arena, including government actions that do not
directly injure any specific individual, but alter the processes of
government so as to make such injuries likely.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF :DUE PROCESS IN STRUCTURAL CASES
The Supreme Court has never said, or even hinted, that due-
process considerations have any place in resolving disputes between
two branches of government. Yet in numerous cases involving the
distribution of national power, the Court has appeared to grope for
some help from the concept of ordered liberty, in some way
recognizing that help is to be had there. The ordered-liberty model
imposes a rationality that does not otherwise exist in the case law.
A. Cases Involvi',tg an Independent Judiciaty
In the effort to discover and explore the role of due process in
what appear to be structural cases, it makes sense to begin with
those cases involving the Judiciary itself-the branch that, through
adjudication, acts most directly upon the due-process rights of
'2' Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). See also Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (stating that concern for "encroachment
and aggrandizement" has animated the Court's separation-of-powersjurisprudence);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) (discussing
"magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
129 (1976) (noting dangers of aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
others).
121 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
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individuals. In these cases the Court has been most inclined to
consider the implications of structure for individual rights.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor122 provides a
good illustration. The issue was whether the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)-a non-article III tribunal-could
constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a counterclaim filed
against a claimant, Schor, who had initially invoked the jurisdiction
of the CFTC for adjudication of his claim. Recognizing that "the
constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of adjudicative
functions to a non-article III body must be assessed by reference to
the purposes underlying the requirements of article II, " 12s Justice
O'Connor for the Court acknowledged that the judicial indepen-
dence contemplated by article MI serves to protect "primarily
personal, rather than structural, interests." 124 Having recognized
that important bridge, the Court concluded that Schor had waived
his "personal" right to article I protections by choosing to file his
claim with the CFTC.
1 25
If concluded there, the Schor opinion would stand as a unique
confirmation of the principle that this Article seeks to establish: the
resolution of structural issues should be informed by consideration
of the potential threat to individual rights. In this case, according
to the Court, there was no threat to due process because the
affected individual had voluntarily subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of the CFTC.
But the Court saw the personal, waivable interest as functionally
and analytically distinct from the structural issue under article III.
Thus, having addressed the former issue, it set about to resolve the
latter: whether the scheme "impermissibly intrude[s] on the
province of the Judiciary."126 This approach to the commands of
article I set up the institutional interest'in protecting judicial turf
as.the focus of the constitutional inquiry. The Court found that the
power given to the CFTC "is limited to that which is necessary to
make the reparations procedure workable," and concluded,
therefore, that "the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch
122 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
123 Id. at 847. The cases involving article III are unique among separation-of-
powers cases in at least trying to invoke this interpretative guide, which is traditional
in other areas of constitutional law. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
124 Id. at 848.
125 See id. at 849.
'26 Id. at 851-52.
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can only be termed de minimis."127 Consequently, the scheme
"does not contravene separation of powers principles or article
1n"
128
The case illustrates how principles of due process can work their
way into opinions addressing the constraints of article III. It also
demonstrates, however, the almost reluctant manner in which the
Court acknowledges such influences, and then quickly returns to its
more familiar and apparently more comfortable frame of reference,
the protection of institutions.
129
Morrison v. Olson' also forced the Court to consider the
contours of article III as it relates to individual rights. The Court
addressed the question whether the special court division estab-
lished by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978's violated article
III's constraints on judicial power. The special division was a three-
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, assigned the power to appoint an independent
counsel and to supervise both the Attorney General's preliminary
investigation of criminal acts allegedly committed by a high-ranking
executive official, and some aspects of the independent counsel's
functions, including her termination.
The Court framed the issue as whether "the Special Division's
exercise of the various powers specifically granted to it under the
Act poses any threat to the 'impartial and independent federal
adjudication of claims within the judicial power of the United
States.'" 13 2 This inquiry reflected the broader goal of "ensur[ing]
the independence of the Judicial Branch and ... prevent[ing] the
Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for the other
127 Id. at 856 (emphasis added).
128 id.
129 The dissent took a more integrated view of structure and purpose: "The Court
erroneously suggests that there is a clear division between the separation of powers
and the impartial adjudication functions of Article III .... In my view, the structural
and individual interests served by Article III are inseparable." Id. at 866-67 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). While that approach shares with the ordered-liberty analysis the
recognition of individual interests in the analysis of structural issues, the dissenters
employed it in an extremely formalistic manner, ultimately finding the statute
unconstitutional not because it threatens those individual interests, but because it fails
to satisfy the strict terms of article II. See id. at 864.
130 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
'3' Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75 (amended by the Ethics in
Government Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039, and the Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988)).132 Morriso, 487 U.S. at 683 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 850).
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branches.1 3  So stated, the issue became just another battle over
turf; the Court articulated an institutional approach to the issue
before it, focusing on the territorial prerogative of the Judiciary.
That approach was in keeping with the general trend of separation-
of-powers analysis, and offered no surprises.
The surprise came in the manner in which the Court chose to
resolve the issue. Keeping in mind that its goal was to discover
whether the statutory scheme had compromised theJudiciary's turf,
consider the Court's two unexpected bases for its negative conclu-
sion:
First, the Act as it currently stands gives the Special Division itself
no power to review any of the actions of the independent counsel
or any of the actions of the Attorney General with regard to the
counsel. Accordingly, there is no risk of partisan or biased adjudica-
tion of claims regarding the independent counsel by that court.
Second, the Act prevents members of the Special Division from
participating in "any judicial proceeding concerning a matter
which involves such independent counsel while such independent
counsel is serving in that office ... ."134
Thus, the Court satisfied itself that article III was not violated-
because the members of the Judicial Branch who participated in the
prosecutorial process of the independent counsel scheme were not
permitted to participate in such a way as to create the potential for
bias or conflict of interest. Far from the usual expressions about
the "core" of article 111,135 or the danger to the Judicial Branch
itself-the concerns the Court ostensibly faces in such cases-these
two justifications for upholding the Act against an .article III
challenge present a classic due-process concern: the assurance of
an impartial decisionmaker for the persons directly affected by the
statutory scheme. 136  It is odd that a challenge brought under
article HI, which simply vests judicial power in the courts and
describes some of the content of that power, should be rejected on
the ground that the challenged scheme provides its own means of
ensuring impartial decisionmaking
13 7
113 Id. at 678.
14 Id. at 683 (quoting statute) (emphasis added);
135 See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 77 (1982) (framing relevant question as "whether the Act has retained 'the
essential attributes of the judicial power'").
" See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
137 This was just one of many issues the Court considered in Morrison; on the rest
it took the more traditional approach. Perhaps the principal constitutional question
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Mistretta v. United States,1 38 involving a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission, contains
similar isolated examples of individual-rights concerns in a separa-
tion-of-powers analysis that also appear to be either accidental or at
least not expressly recognized for what they are. The challenged
statutory provisions1s 9 created a commission, described as "an
independent commission in the Judicial Branch," whose seven
voting members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, included three federal judges. 14° The President retained
the power to remove all members from the Commission, "for
cause." 14 1 The Commission would promulgate mandatory sen-
tencing guidelines for federal judges to follow in criminal cas-
es.
142
The case raised several constitutional issues, including whether
the statute unconstitutionally vested in the President the power to
remove from the Commissionjudges who had been appointed to it-
article HI judges sitting on an independent, nonadjudicatory
commission within the Judiciary.143 The Court responded as
follows: "[W]e see no risk that the President's limited removal
power will compromise the impartiality of Article III judges serving
on the Commission and, consequently, no risk that the Act's
removal provision will prevent the Judicial Branch from performing
its constitutionally assigned function offairly adjudicating cases and
in the case was whether the establishment of an independent counsel having
prosecutorial powers and duties free of Executive Branch control (except for the
President's power to remove for good cause) violated principles of separated powers.
See Morrison, 487 US. at 683. The Court resolved the issue by stating that the Act did
not disrupt the proper balance between the branches by interfering with the
Executive's ability to perform its constitutionally assigned functions. See id. at 695.
In this and the other issues discussed in the opinion, the Court adhered to an
institutional approach.
138 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
139 The Commission was created to achieve the goals of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-59 (1988)).
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
141 Id.
142 See id. § 991(b).
143 Other issues presented in the case included: whether by allowing the
Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines, Congress improperly delegated
legislative power; whether a body residing in the Judicial Branch and comprised, in
part, of active federal judges, could constitutionally exercise the rulemaking and
policymaking functions inherent in the promulgation of sentencing guidelines; and
whether judges could be assigned the extrajudicial duties provided in the Act.
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controversies." 14 It is curious that the Court viewed article III as
containing a mandate that the Judiciary decide its cases and
controversies fairly. Article MI, of course, contains no such express
provision; that notion resides only implicitly in article I and is
considered primarily to be a creature of the due process clause.
Thus, while professing an intention to enforce the terms of article
III, ostensibly out of concern for the interests of the Judicial Branch
itself,14 the Court actually relied on doctrine associated with due-
process protections.
146
The examples given above might suggest that the Court had
adopted the very principle that this Article proposes; that it had, in
fact, resorted to considerations of individual rights in its treatment
of structural issues. But these few references to due process in the
article III cases are almost de minimis aberrations in the vast body of
structural jurisprudence, unexplained by the Court and even
unacknowledged as anything different from the institutional
rhetoric that characterizes the bulk of the Court's separation-of-
powers decisions. Perhaps the explanation is that article III is the
sole structural provision that has direct impact on individual rights,
both empirically and as a matter of historical development.
14 7
The Judicial Branch can be understood, therefore, as the branch
where institutional and individual interests coalesce. The Court's
occasional consideration of individual interests in article HI cases
may, in fact, be an incidental part of, rather than a real aberration
from, its more typical focus on the concerns of the branches
themselves.
144 Mistreta, 488 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
145 Historically, the common law system presumed the impartiality of the courts.
Thus article III's investiture of 'judicial power" in the federal courts probably
represents an implicit requirement of fairness in adjudication.
146 The Court resolved the bulk of the issues in the case from the usual turf-based
perspective. For example, to the objection that ajudicial entity was improperly given
rulemaking authority, the Court responded, "Congress may delegate to the Judicial
Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of
another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary."
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388. Similarly, "Congress cannot be said to have aggrandized
the authority of th[eJudicial] Branch or to have deprived the Executive Branch of a
power it once possessed." Id. at 395.
147 The common law courts originally developed as a response to the often
oppressive rules of the various feudal lords in England. See F. POLLOCK & F.
MArrLAND, supra note 145, at 145-48. The very reasons for which they arose,
therefore, demonstrate their historically close connection to the protection of
individual rights.
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B. Cases Involving Tension Between Articles I and II
Other separation-of-powers cases also raise issues involving
individual rights. INS v. Chadha1 48 is one case in which institu-
tional propriety clearly affected individual rights. Chadha applied
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and received a
determination of "extreme hardship," which would have permitted
him to remain in this country despite the expiration of his student
visa. 149 Following a procedure authorized by the Immigration
and Nationality Act,15° however, the House of Representatives,
without debate or recorded vote, passed a resolution to reverse the
INS decision and deport Chadha.151  Chadha challenged the
House action on constitutional grounds.
In addressing Chadha's constitutional claim, the Court took the
institutional point of view: it first sought to determine whether the
one-house veto was an exercise of "legislative power." Having
determined that the House action was legislative, with the aid of an
initial presumption to that effect,152 the Court concluded that the
procedural requirements of article I-bicameral passage and
presentment to the President for veto or signature-should apply to
the measure, but had not been followed in this case: a neat exercise
in absolutely mechanical application of the terms of the Constitu-
tion. The Court did mention a possible reason for its mechanical
formalism at the very end of the opinion when it added, "we have
not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the
exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled
out in the Constitution." 15 The Court did not, however, indicate
how, if at all, that principle might assist in the disposition of this
case.
Justice Powell, on the other hand, put that maxim to work. In
his view, the case presented "the danger of subjecting the determi-
nation of the rights of one person to the 'tyranny of shifting
majorities. ' " 154  Indeed, Justice Powell expressly rejected an
argument aimed at the purely structural, "turf"-oriented view of
148 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
149 See id. at 924.
150 8 U.S.C. § 1254(cX2) (amended 1986).'
151 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926-27.
152 See id. at 951-52.
'5s Id. at 959.
" Id. at 961 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of
Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 375 (1976)).
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separated powers in favor of a more substantive approach to the
issue:
The House and the Senate argue that the legislative veto does not
prevent the executive from exercising its constitutionally assigned
function. Even assuming this argument is correct, it does not
address the concern that the Congress is exercising unchecked
judicial power at the expense of individual liberties. It was
precisely to prevent such arbitrary action that the Framers adopted
the doctrine of separation of powers.
155
Thus, in the view of one member of the Court, the larger objectives
of separated powers, rather than the institutional interests of the
branches themselves, resolve the case.156
In Bowsher v. Synar,157 the majority took an institutional per-
spective again. That case presented a challenge to the "Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act"158 by which Congress, in an effort to
reduce the federal deficit, gave the Comptroller General the power
to review reports from both the Executive's Office of Management
and Budget and the Legislature's Congressional Budget Office, and
to "recommend" to the President specific spending cuts that should
be made to meet deficit-reduction targets. The President was
required to comply with the Comptroller General's conclusions. A
member of Congress and a union of certain federal employees
challenged this scheme on separation-of-powers grounds.
The Court found that the Comptroller General was an agent of
Congress and that the Act authorized him to exercise executive
powers, an unacceptable combination. "The structure of the
Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it
15 Id. at 963 n.4.
'M The thrust ofJustice Powell's concurrence-that the one-house veto constituted
an exercise ofjudicial power-is not relevant to the argument put forward here. I do
not mean to endorse any attempt to pigeonhole government action into one of the
three departments. But I do applaud Justice Powell's effort to look beyond that
categorization to the real problem with the case: Chadha appeared to have been
deprived of liberty without due process of law. In that respect, the analysis in Chadha
should have differed from that of subsequent cases raising the constitutionality of the
legislative veto, but in a context not so clearly affecting individual rights. Cf. Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy-Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983)
(affirming summarily decision invalidating legislative veto as applied to Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission regulations of national gas pricing); United States
Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (affirming summarily decision invalidating two-
house veto of FTC rulemaking).
157 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
158 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22 (1988)).
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follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control
what it does not possess."1 59 Although the Court acknowledged
"that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of
power were [for the Framers] critical to preserving liberty,"160 it
did not accord that idea any importance in its constitutional
analysis.
Justice Stevens' concurrence examined the liberty principle
more thoughtfully. Although he did not identify any specific
individuals in the case who might be said to possess due-process
interests, he did express his general concern that legislative
delegation of authority to an agent of Congress, such as the
Comptroller General, can lead ultimately to a loss of due-process
protections. Noting that the problem of procedural unfairness has
largely been alleviated in the case of legislative delegation to
independent or executive agencies, 16 1 Justice Stevens perceived
a danger in permitting delegation to an entity that is not con-
strained by such procedural requirements. Thus he avoided the
futile exercise, so common in modern separation-of-powers
opinions, of defining a specific governmental function as legislative
or executive, and sought to protect the separation of powers instead
by protecting governmental process-what he termed a "due process
of lawmaking." 162 Not being subject to any specific procedural
constraints, the Comptroller General was not an appropriate
delegate in whom Congress could repose the challenged powers.
Justice Stevens' analysis is consistent with my ordered-liberty
approach. It focuses on the threat of arbitrary government conduct
which arises with the impairment of government process, rather
than searching for specific instances of due-process violation. Any
government action that causes such impairment, because of the
threat it engenders, offends the Constitution. Once such impair-
ment becomes evident, the Court should strike down the challenged
action as a violation of separated powers.
1 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
160 Id. at 730.
161 See infra notes 190-206 and accompanying text (discussing nondelegation
doctrine).
162 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 757 n.23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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C. Other Doctrines Linking Due Process and Separated Powers
The importance of due-process principles to separation-of-
powers issues also informs cases decided under doctrines that do
not explicitly involve the separation of powers. Examples of these
doctrines are "standing," "nondelegation," and the "administrative
separation of functions."
1. Standing
The doctrine of standing provides the Court with an opportunity
to decide which litigants are appropriate spokespersons for the
airing of complaints in a judicial forum. Those who are granted
standing will be afforded the chance to litigate their claims of
injury, while those who are denied standing are deprived of access
to the federal judiciary and relegated to the Legislative or Executive
Branch to pursue "political" solutions to their grievances.
163
The Supreme Court has said that a standing requirement resides
in article M of the Constitution,'" although the text of article HI
contains no such express requirement. The Court has long held
that the need for a litigant to have standing before invoking the
jurisdiction of a federal court derives from the Constitution's
definition of judicial power as extending to specified "cases" and
"controversies. 165
[T]he "case or controversy" requirement defines with respect to
the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the
Federal Government is founded. The several doctrines that have
grown up to elaborate that requirement are "founded in concern
about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society."
166
Thus, from the Supreme Court's concern that it must protect the
separated powers has sprung a rule affecting the individual's ability
to seek judicial redress.
167
13 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
(holding that generalized injury is insufficient to confer standing); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (same).
164 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984).
165 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The current three-part test for standing is
discussed infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
16 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
1 67 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Indeed, critics of some of the
Court's standing decisions point to the fact that a concern for separation-of-powers
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If I am correct in positing that separation of powers is intended,
in part, to ensure the protection of every individual's due-process
rights, then it should follow that standing doctrine, described as a
necessary corollary to the separated powers, facilitates the protec-
tion of due process in some way. A close analysis of who is included
and who is excluded by the current standing rules supports just that
conclusion. Although the existence of some limit on access to the
federal courts may derive originally from values other than
protection of individual rights, 168 the particular rules the Court
has devised to accomplish that limitation do so in a way that
protects due-process interests.
Under modern standing doctrine, the plaintiff must allege such
a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" 169 as to
ensure that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented
in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution."170 Those general guidelines have been
interpreted to require that a litigant allege an "injury in fact,"
17 1
which means a "distinct and palpable" injury,172 one that is not
"abstract," "conjectural," or "hypothetical,"17 3 but suffered per-
sonally by the claimant.174 Moreover, that injury must be "fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to
be redressed by the requested relief."175 The three prerequisites
to standing, then, are injury, causation, and redressability.
It appears that the language of article III precludes just any
litigant with just any claim from invoking the jurisdiction of a
federal court. The task of the Court, therefore, has been to fashion
a doctrine that will permit some claims and preclude others. The
particular test the Court has devised to perform this screening
function is instructive: the three-part test for standing, set forth
norms, rather than the satisfaction of the three standing requirements, appears to
motivate the Court in reaching certain standing decisions. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 789-
95, 792 n.10 (Stevens,J., dissenting); Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1459 (1988).
168 The notion that access should be limited at all is probably a consequence of
the "cases" and "controversies" language of article III.
"6 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
170 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
171 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
172 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
173 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 494 (1974).
174 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
175 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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above, describes the same plaintiffs who, in a different context,
would be said to have a due-process interest, or a right to procedur-
al protections for the injury they have suffered. "The extent to
which procedural due process must be afforded... is influenced by
the extent to which [someone] may be 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss'...."
176
The similarity between "injury in fact" and "grievous loss"
suggests that the Court uses its standing rules to interpret the
command of article II in a way to ensure that, in theory,177 those
with the type of interest that due process protects are not shut out
of the federal forum on standing grounds. Thus, a rule arising out
of a concern for the separation of powers has evolved into a way of
protecting individuals from arbitrary denial of federal redress.
178
Moreover, the standing rules and the law of due process have
continued to develop along parallel lines. As the due process clause
has evolved to provide increasing procedural protections for new
kinds of interests, such as entitlements to government benefits,
179
the standing rules have followed a similar trend. In Goldberg v.
Kelly" the Court abandoned the common-law distinction be-
tween rights and privileges for purposes of procedural protection,
and greatly enlarged the reach of due process to include beneficia-
ries of federal regulatory programs.
The same month the Court issued the Goldberg decision it also
decided Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp,181 in which it abandoned the restrictive common-law "legal
176 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (FrankfurterJ., concurring)).
The test has since been refined to focus on the expectations created by statute or
custom. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
177 1 do not mean to suggest that the test always works perfectly. See, e.g., Allen,
468 U.S. 737 (denying standing to parents of public-school children who claimed the
IRS was not enforcing the rules denying tax exemptions to segregated private
institutions).
178 One could legitimately ask why the standing rules should not be more
inclusive, if protecting individuals is the goal. My answer is that the case-or-
controversy limitation governs that aspect of the standing inquiry. My point is not
that individual rights are furthered by rules limiting standing, but only that if standing
is to be limited, these standing rules work to avoid excluding parties whose interests
are the sort that generally warrant due-process protection (not-taking into account
issues of state action).
179 See generally Reich, The New Propery, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964) (describing
evolving status of government benefits).
'80 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
181 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Clark v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388,
396-402 (1987) (applying "zone of interest" test).
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interest" test for standing and moved toward a much more inclusive
test that examines whether the plaintiff was "arguably within the
zone" of interests protected by the statutory or constitutional
provision allegedly violated by the defendant.1 8 2  That case
opened the door for judicial recognition of the new class of "public-
law plaintiffs" who seek to enforce the statutory rights of regulatory
beneficiaries. 18 3  The Data Processing decision is the perfect
counterpart to the Court's treatment of the corresponding due-
process issue in Goldberg v. Kelly.
The analogy holds for the other two prongs of the standing test.
Just as the standing rules would preclude a litigant whose injury
either was caused by someone not a party before the court (causa-
tion) or whose injury is for some other reason not capable of
redress by the court (redressability), the standard due-process
analysis of determining "what process is due" would also find that
the plaintiff's interest, under the same circumstances, is not entitled
to due-process protection. Under the balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge,184 which weighs the interests of the parties
and determines the value of additional procedures to a given
controversy, process would be denied to one who could not meet
causation or redressability criteria because its value in such a case
would be very low. Thus, again, the two doctrines-one designed to
preserve the separation of powers and the other to protect the life,
liberty, and property of individuals-yield analogous results.
The correspondence between standing and due process also
emerges in an examination of who is left out by the standing rules.
The Supreme Court has made quite clear that not everyone who
satisfies the three-part test for standing will automatically receive it.
For example, standing will be denied to anyone whose alleged injury
is so generalized or diffuse that a great number of citizens are
affected in the same way by the challenged action. 185 That is, to
receive judicial review, a p laintiff must have been singled out in
some way for disadvantageous individual treatment. 186 This focus
182 Data Proesing, 397 U.S. at 153.
183 See Sunstein, supra note 167, at 1446-47.
184 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
185 See e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227
(1974) (finding a generalized interest in independence of government branches too
abstract to constitute a case); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1976)
(finding respondent's request for release of CIA expenditures a generalized grievance
and the impact of non-release policy on respondent undifferentiated and common to
the public).
186 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915)
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on individual treatment is a classic characteristic of due pro-
cess.187 Thus, the correlation between standing and due process
holds up in this respect as well.
Another group of plaintiffs who are denied standing are those
for whom Congress has legislatively precluded standing or demon-
strated an intent to limit regulatory or statutory lawsuits.18s
Applying a due-process analysis to this rule of standing, such
preclusion would be justified because the passage of legislation by
Congress itself satisfies due-process concerns. "Where a rule of
conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that
every one should have a direct voice in its adoption."18 9 To the
extent Congress has acted, by general legislation, to deny standing
to a class of potential litigants under a statutory scheme, those
litigants have already received their due process.
The parallels are more than coincidence. The Court has in fact
created a doctrine that seeks to afford standing to those who have
the kind of interest that principles of due process protect. It has
fashioned a separation-of-powers principle to further the protection
of individual rights.
2. Nondelegation Doctrine
Decisions addressing the delegation of power by the Legislative
Branch to the Executive also support the link between separated
powers and due process. Although the nondelegation doctrine
arose out of a perceived need to preserve the separation of
governmental powers, the concerns that the doctrine is intended to
address are, at bottom, procedural due-process concerns.
Article I, section 1 of the Constitution provides that all legisla-
tive powers shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.
Although apparently a grant of power to Congress, this section also
establishes that "[t]he Congress manifestly is not permitted to
abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions
(finding no constitutional right for all individuals "to be heard before a matter can
be decided in which all are equally concerned"); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373,
385 (1908) (holding that residents of paving district have the right to be heard during
proceeding to set paving tax).
187 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); Bi-
Metallic, 239 US. at 446.
18See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 348 (1984)
("Congress intended that judicial review of market orders issued under the Act
ordinarily be confined to suits brought by handlers").
189 Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445.
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with which it is thus vested." 196  Limits must be imposed on
Congress's authority to delegate "if our constitutional system is to
be maintained." 19 1 This prohibition is known as the nondelega-
tion doctrine.
19 2
Early on, the Court, recognizing the need for flexibility,
acknowledged Congress' authority to devolve upon others the duty
of carrying out a declared legislative policy, to "fill up the details"
under general provisions made by the legislature. 193 As long as
Congress lays down "an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power. " 194 The
nondelegation doctrine, therefore, has sought to distinguish
between those delegations that provide meaningful standards to
ensure that "[w]hat the President was required to do was simply in
execution of the act of Congress," 195 and those that undermine
the policies of article I of the Constitution.
196
The nondelegation doctrine concerns separation of powers
between the Congress and the Executive. 197 It involves "the
constitutional processes of legislation which are an essential part of
190 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
191 Id.
192 SeeJ. PIERCEJR., S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
§ 3.4, at 51 (1985).
195 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
194 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). See also
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944).
195 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892).
196 Although surely Professor Davis is correct that the Court no longer applies the
doctrine in a meaningful way, see 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRFATISE §§ 3.3.,
3.5, 3.6 (2d ed. 1978), the Court continues to recite the verbal formulas and thereby
effectively keeps the doctrine alive. The Court recently reiterated that "so long as
Congress provides an administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such
that a court could 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,' no
delegation of legislative authority trenching on the principle of separation of powers
has occurred." Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1726, 1731 (1989)
(internal citations omitted); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379
(1989) (applying "intelligible principle" test).197 See Kramer, The Constitution as Architecture: A Charette, 65 IND. L.J. 277, 288
(1990) (arguing that separation of powers requires limits on congressional
delegation); Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The Constitutional
Puposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 355, 387 (1987) ("delegation is a
separation of powers issue"); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371 ("The nondelegation doctrine
is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system
of government."). See also Krent, Fragmenting the Unitay Executive: Congressional
Delegations ofAdministrative Authority Outside the Federal Government 85 Nw. U.L. REV.
62, 69-80 (1990) (discussing separation-of-powers concerns raised by private
delegations).
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our system of government." 198 The concern underlying the
nondelegation doctrine is a concern for the structural integrity of
the government.
199
Nevertheless, the rhetoric surrounding the question of delega-
tion does not include the traditional language about separated
powers. Rather, according to the Court, the evils of excessive
delegation include the possibility of conferring "unlimited pow-
er,"20 0 "unfettered discretion,"20 1 and "uncontrolled legislative
power"20 2 on the Executive Branch, and "the danger of over-
broad, unauthorized, and arbitrary application of criminal sanc-
tions." 203 Those evils do not jeopardize the institutional interests
of the branches-they jeopardize individual rights. They pose the
threat of arbitrary enforcement of the law-an injury that due process
is supposed to prevent.
The due-process concerns that the Court has repeatedly
articulated in the delegation context have given rise to a series of
requirements that Congress must satisfy to survive a nondelegation
attack. Those requirements are entirely procedural. 20 4 In short,
to avoid an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an
administrative agency, Congress "must enjoin upon [the agency] a
certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the
performance of its function." 205 Once that has been accom-
plished, the structural concerns that apparently initiated the
resistance to legislative delegation in the first place vanish in the
confidence that individual rights have been preserved;2°6 depar-
tures from the pure principle of separated powers are "cured" of
196 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
199 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935)
(stating that excessive delegation "is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent
with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress" (emphasis added)).
:0: Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266,
285 (1933).
201 Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 431.
202 Id. at 432.
203 Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 272 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
M SeeJ. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 192, § 3.4.2, at 55.
205 Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922).
206 Professor Davis makes the transition to due process explicit. See K. DAVIS,
supra note 196, § 3.15. He advocates a newly constituted nondelegation doctrine,
whose acknowledged purpose should be "to protect private parties against injustice
on account of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power." Id. § 3.15, at 208.
In my judgment, that purpose has been present but unacknowledged all along.
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their unconstitutionality by increased provision for procedural
protection of individual rights.
It seems a strange notion that process-niceties like notice, a
hearing, and a decision on the record-could ever be thought to
compensate for deficiencies in the three-part division of power
required by the Constitution. An abundance of process effectively
validates acts that the Executive Branch would otherwise be without
authority to commit. But the strangeness diminishes with the
recognition that procedural requirements and separated powers are
simply different limitations on the exercise of government power,
sharing a common goal: to restrict arbitrary government action that
is likely to harm the rights of individuals. Once that principle is
acknowledged as an important factor in the constitutional structure,
then the different expressions of the principle no longer seem
incongruous, the interchangeability no longer unpalatable.
3. Separation of Functions
20 7
The remarkable point about the development of administrative
agencies is that the Supreme Court has never seriously questioned
the validity of the commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial
functions in this context.2 0 8 One would think that if ever there
is a violation of the separation of powers, it would come from
blending in a single entity the authority to exercise, in the classic
sense, all three types of government power.
29
At the same time, it is striking that the modern spate of cases
expanding due-process protection has arisen primarily in the area
of administrative action.2 10  Almost instinctively, the law now
207 The so-called "separation of functions" is a concept generally associated with
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988). See
Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative
Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759, 761-79 (1981). The effects of that Act so profoundly
pervade the field of administrative law that it is difficult to distinguish which of its
requirements may or may not be required by the Constitution itself. For simplicity,
I will discuss the concept of separ ated functions as if the statutory and constitutional
requirements were one and the same, recognizing that there may be pitfalls in such
an approach.
The Court has made sure, however, that such commingling does not interfere
with the right to a "fair trial in a fair tribunal." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46
(1975) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
209 See Strauss, supra note 48, at 581-83.
2 10 See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY
545-61 (2d ed. 1985).
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recognizes that when functions are not truly separate, individual
rights need explicit procedural protections.
211
Indeed, the commingling within one agency of all three powers
that the Constitution attempts to divide has raised the eyebrows
both of those who fear for the separation of powers, 212 and of
those who fear for the erosion of due-process protections.
213
Both camps seem to have been placated by the adoption of certain
rules that prohibit the same agency employee from participating in
the investigative or prosecutorial stages of a case (executive power)
and also the adjudicative or decisionmaking stages (judicial
power).214 The removal of incentives for biased decisionmaking,
a core due-process notion,215 satisfies concerns regarding how the
governmental body is constituted, a structural notion. Due-process
principles, therefore, compensate for departures from the structural
constitutional norms.
What is most intriguing is that the Court and the commentators
seem to accept the barter. To me that means that the correlation
between due process and separated powers has a deep-seated, if not
acknowledged, place in constitutional jurisprudence.
IV. THE THEORY APPLIED
The theory of ordered liberty as a component of separated
powers can supply strong guidance to the courts in their efforts to
resolve specific cases. Applying the ordered-liberty analysis to a
separation-of-powers attack, a court first would inquire whether the
challenged action tends to foster unaccountable, biased, or
211 This principle underlies some of the jurisprudence surrounding the right to
a tribunal independent of the political controls of Congress. In Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982), for example, the
Court held that the possibility of congressional control over bankruptcy judges,
empowered to adjudicate private rights but not afforded the guarantees of
independence provided under article III, rendered the federal bankruptcy scheme
unconstitutional. See Krattenmaker, Article lII andJudicial lndependene: Why the New
Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutiona4 70 GEo. L.J. 297, 304-05 (1981). The lack of
true separation between the authorizing legislature and the tribunals it established,
in an area where individual rights would be directly affected, was fatal to the scheme.
2 12 See; e.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 210, at 41-43 (arguing that
traditional practice of separated powers has been threatened by creation of agencies).
2 13 See; e.g., Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatoty State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
407, 471-72 (1989) (discussing the Constitution's role in providing procedural
safeguards in administrative context).
214 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988); Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35 (1975).
215 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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otherwise arbitrary government decisionmaking and, if so, whether
that impairment of government process will affect individuals.
The objective of this approach is not to substitute a due-process
claim for a separation-of-powers claim. 2 16  Clearly, situations
often arise in which an individual suffers an actual violation of due
process because of a deviation from structural norms,2 17 but those
cases can be disposed of under the due process clause; no separa-
tion-of-powers analysis is required. Rather, the goal of the ordered-
liberty approach is to interpret the structural provisions of the
Constitution consistently with their purpose and spirit. It follows
that the kinds of concerns that would be relevant to the structural
inquiry under the ordered-liberty approach would be different, at
least in degree, from those that would be pertinent to analysis of a
claimed violation of the due process clause. Some examples follow.
There are three general types of cases in which a party challeng-
es some action as structu:rally flawed, but does not claim to have
suffered an actual violation of due-process rights: (1) those in which
an individual claims direct injury as a result of government action;
(2) those in which no individual has clearly been injured directly,
but the government action has had some effect on persons; and (3)
those in which the challenged action has no discernible effect on
any identifiable person. In the first group are those cases in which
an individual is subjected directly to the suspect government
conduct and launches a challenge under the structural provisions of
the Constitution. Cases of this type present clear individual-rights
considerations, which the Court implicitly recognizes when it
accords standing to these plaintiffs to enforce structural provisions
of the Constitution. Under the ordered-liberty approach, those
considerations, emanating from due-process traditions, should
inform the Court's resolution of the structural issues pressed in the
case.
216 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 306 (asking "whether due process can do the work
of segaration of powers").
2 See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 815-
25 (1987) (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment) (finding due-process violation where
judges promulgate rule, prosecute its violation, and adjudicate guilt); Tumey, 273 U.S.
at 522-26, 531-33 (finding due-process violation where mayor adjudicates prohibition
violations and receives fines from those found guilty); In re Ross, 99 Nev. 1,656 P.2d
832, 837-39, reh'g denied 99 Nev. 657, 668 P.2d 1089 (1983) (finding due-process
violation where state bar association adjudicates disciplinary actions and receives fines
from those found guilty).
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In Morrison v. Oson,218 for example, the target of an indepen-
dent counsel investigation claimed that the counsel's independence
from presidential control was constitutionally improper, but he
probably could not have shown that he personally suffered the type
of injury necessary to support a claim of due-process violation.
219
Thus Olson crafted his constitutional argument under the rubric of
separation of powers rather than the due process clause.
The ordered-liberty approach begins with an inquiry into the
potential for procedural unfairness caused by the independent
counsel scheme. As discussed above,220 the independent counsel
statute at issue in the case contained numerous procedural
protections to guard against arbitrary or biased decision-making on
the part of the government actors-the independent counsel and the
court. Despite formalist arguments that the independent counsel
should have been subject to the control of the Executive Branch to
achieve some abstract conformity with constitutional text, it appears
that any actual likelihood of harm to a target had been ameliorated
in advance by procedural formalities provided in the statute.
221
As the Court concluded when it resolved this case under principles
which it alone understood, a court applying the ordered-liberty
approach would probably determine that the statute should survive
separation-of-powers attack.
A paradigmatic case in the first group is Mistretta v. United
States,222 in which the Court considered the constitutionality,
under principles of separated powers, of the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission and the guidelines it promulgated. 223  Caught
218 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
219 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (concluding that to prevail on a
selective prosecution claim, defendant must show impermissible classification factors).
2" See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
221 Some showed surprise at the decision in Morrison because it was the first time
the modern Court departed from its rather rigid, apparently formalistic approach to
such cases. See Alfange, supra note 50, at 671. The decision also surprised those who
thought the driving force behind the Court's modern separation-of-powers
jurisprudence had been a desire to protect the unitary executive from encroachments
by the Congress. See Carter, supra note 61, at 360-61. When one sees that due
process has really been an animating principle all along, however, the outcome of
Morrison is perfectly predictable, even if tie express analysis obscures the best
rationale for the decision: the independent counsel statute at issue adequately
protected the due-process rights of actually and potentially affected individuals; there
was thus no reason for the Court to strike it down.
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
2"The composition of the Commission and its placement in the Judicial Branch
are described supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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up in such questions as whether one branch impermissibly arrogated
to itself the powers of another, or attempted to "undermine the
authority and independence of one or another coordinate
branch,"224 the Court overlooked entirely the deeper values that
consolidation of power threatens, and found, simply, that the
branches had been adequately looked after in the statute.2 25 The
Court upheld the entire sentencing scheme.
The Court's complete disregard for the effects of the sentencing
scheme on individual rights led it to the incorrect result. Sentenc-
ing in criminal cases is clearly an area in which individual rights are
especially vulnerable. The Court should have decided whether the
innovative structural techniques Congress employed in commis-
sioning the sentencing guidelines posed a threat to individual rights,
a question it did not even consider.
If the Court had contemplated the ways in which the structural
changes made by the statute might impair the integrity of govern-
mental process, it would have recognized that the statute brought
about a substantial shift in the control of sentencing decisions. The
Act provided that the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the
Commission would be binding on federal judges, leaving them very
little flexibility or discretion once a conviction was returned. In
place of the traditional role of judge as the critical figure in the
sentencing phase of a criminal case, the new scheme, in effect,
placed the bulk of sentencing decisionmaking in the hands of the
prosecutor through a combination of the charging choices available
and the mandatory sentencing laws. Thus, the statute brought
about a significant structural change, consolidating in the Executive
Branch the power both to prosecute and to sentence. Classic
principles of due process, including the right to be judged by an
impartial tribunal, counsel against such a commingling of essential
functions.
Indeed, after the Supreme Court decided Mistretta, a federal
district court held that the authority this sentencing scheme vests in
24 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382.
The opinion is a model of the institutional perspective. See e.g., id. at 390
("the sentencing function long hai; been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the
Branches of Government and has :never been thought of as the exclusive constitution-
al province of any one Branch"); id. at 393 ("no threat of undermining the integrity
of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond
constitutional bounds"); id. at 395 ("Congress cannot be said to have aggrandized the
authority of that Branch or to have deprived the Executive Branch of a power it once
possessed").
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the prosecutor actually violates due process. 226  Existence of an
actual due-process violation is not necessary to the ordered-liberty
analysis, but is surely sufficient to suggest that the Court's consider-
ation of the structural issues in Mistretta should have included these
concerns. If consideration of individual rights had held sway with
the Court, it is likely that the statute would not have survived the
constitutional attack on separation-of-powers grounds.
A final example of a case in the first category22 7 is Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saryer.228 The government action at issue was
the President's attempted seizure of private property-the steel
mills-during the Korean conflict. Ordered liberty would support
the Court's decision to enjoin the seizure as a violation of structural
principles of the Constitution. In addition to the Court's rationale-
the President lacked substantive constitutional authority for the
seizure-that act also deviated from procedural norms for the taking
of private property, bypassing both statutory authorization and
judicial proceedings, as well as working a direct harm on the
property rights of individuals. The ordered-liberty analysis indicates
a due-process concern that renders the President's exercise of
power suspect.
A second category comprises cases in which there is no such
clear property or liberty interest, but which nonetheless involve
impairment of process in some way that threatens the values
underlying separated powers. In this group, although the violation
has no obvious "victim," there does exist some plaintiff who can
achieve standing to bring the claim. In such cases, the ordered-
liberty analysis would have the Court ask whether the challenged
scheme fosters tendencies toward inaccuracy, lack of accountability,
or unfairness. If so, the scheme is constitutionally suspect under
principles of separation of powers.
226 See United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (D.D.C. 1989) (Greene,
J.), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Judge
Greene's holding in Roberts was in effect a determination that the separation-of-
powers issues to which the creation of the Sentencing Commission had given rise
need never be reached because there were already justiciable claims of due-process
violation. My treatment of Mistretta proceeds as if there were no such viable due-
process claim. This reflects the posture in which the case went to the Supreme Court,
as well as the conclusion reached by the court of appeals in Mills.
227 An additional case in this group is INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
discussed supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
228 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Bowsher v. Synar229 is such a case. The Comptroller General's
authority to make budget cuts was challenged on separation-of-
powers grounds.23 0 Although there was no individual with an
immediate role in the challenged process, the Court granted
standing to a union of federal employees who were to lose a
scheduled increase in benefits as a result of the Comptroller's
budget cuts.
23 1
The ordered-liberty approach to this case is quite similar to the
approach outlined in Justice Stevens' concurrence. 23 2  As that
opinion articulated (although probably with something a bit
different in mind), the delegation of power at issue in Bowsher
provided for none of the procedural protections that are available
either when Congress acts as a whole or when Congress delegates
legislative power to the Executive Branch.233 In both situations,
measures are built into the system to ensure the integrity of the
process-that is, to protect the rights of individuals potentially
affected. 234  No such protection existed to ensure that the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act would not become an instrument of
tyrannical consolidation of power; none had already been estab-
lished by case law, and none was provided in the statute itself.
There was no need for any inquiry into whether the "rights" of the
Executive Branch had been trammeled or the powers of Congress
aggrandized.3 5  What was important was whether the system
adequately guarded against the arbitrary exercise of government
power. It did not. Thus the scheme compromised the principles of
separated powers.
Another example in the second category is United States v.
Nixon,2 M the famous Watergate tapes case. The Court considered
whether a district court, engaged in a criminal trial to which certain
materials in the possession of the President (the Watergate tapes)
had been determined to be relevant, had the power to compel the
229 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
2o See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
23 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721.
22 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
2ss.See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 757-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
234 For example, when Congress itself legislates, it must follow the procedures
articulated in article I. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-57 (1983). When it
delegates legislative power to an agency, it must provide for substantive guidance and
procedural protection in order to make the delegation valid. See supra notes 190-206
and accompanying text (discussing delegation).
235 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27.
236 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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President to turn over those materials under subpoena. The
President urged the Court to recognize an absolute privilege
shielding him from judicial compulsion. The Court ultimately
recognized the existence of a qualified executive privilege emanat-
ing from article II, but determined that in Nixon the privilege was
outweighed by interests favoring disclosure.
The ordered-liberty approach would begin the analysis with an
examination of who is likely to be injured by the government action
under consideration-here, in effect, the insulation of the Executive
Branch from the compulsory process of the Judiciary. In Nixon, the
prosecution requested the subpoena and stood to benefit from the
forced disclosure. 2 7 At first blush there would appear to be no
individual rights at stake: the case is a struggle among the Presi-
dent, an independent counsel, and the Judiciary, all of which
represent institutional, rather than personal, interests. If individual
due-process interests are prerequisite to any interference by the
Supreme Court in the affairs of the other branches, then this
appears to be a case in which the Court should have let the
President do as he pleased. But the analysis goes deeper.
The Court next should consider whether the proposed exercise
of government power (here the power to assert executive privilege
in the face of a subpoena in a criminal case) has a real potential for
increasing the risk of injury to individual rights; whether, by tainting
the governmental process, it will create an environment conducive to
the arbitrary exercise of power that the Constitution seeks to
prevent. And in this case, such a risk exists. There is no reason
why a request for production of documents from the President in
a criminal case will always or even usually come from the govern-
ment; on the contrary, in most cases, where the Executive Branch
is itself prosecuting the criminal action, such a request is much
more likely to come from the defense. If the prosecution (execu-
tive) could assert privilege to prevent defense access to relevant
information with impunity, a clear issue of due process would
arise.
238
27 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court made it seem that the case
involved a constitutional right to discovery, even discussing the "right to the
production of all evidence at a criminal trial [which] has constitutional dimensions."
Id. at 711. He also cited the danger of."cut[ting] deeply into the guarantee of due
process of law" by recognizing a presidential privilege. Id. at 712. He did not make
clear that, in Nixon, those rights had no application because no criminal defendant
had requested production of the tapes.
2" See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957) (holding that district
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Recognition of an absolute privilege residing in article H would
have had tremendous potential to affect important individual rights.
It would have amounted to the Judiciary's acquiescing in a criminal
system which allowed one governmental department both to
prosecute a defendant and to control his defense. That appears to
be just the type of consolidation of power that the system of
separated powers was intended to thwart.
By denying the President the absolute privilege he claimed, the
Court did the correct thing under the "ordered-liberty" analysis. It
may have gone too far, however, when it acknowledged the
existence of some "qualified" executive privilege that might be
successful in other cases. At the point where individual interests
end and the institutional interest represented by article II alone
remains, the Court should not be the champion of the latter
interest.
The third and final group of structural cases embraces those in
which, again, the structural violation has no obvious victim, but in
which no plaintiff with standing exists.23 9 In these cases, even if
one branch has violated the principle of separated powers in some
way, the ordered-liberty analysis has no application.
The mission of the separation of powers-protection of individu-
al rights-has no role to play when the potential effect on such rights
is either non-existent or so attenuated as to be incapable of
informing the structural analysis. In those cases, therefore, through
the doctrines of standing or political question, the Court should
leave the political branches to work out for themselves the appropri-
ate allocation of power, using the weapons provided to them in the
Constitution.
court committed reversible erroir by allowing government to refuse to disclose
material information to defense; recognition of privilege in such circumstances
violates fundamental fairness); H.R. REP. No. 831 (I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980)
(discussing "disclose or dismiss* dilemma when defendant is denied use of relevant
but classified information, often resulting in dismissal). These issues have been dealt
with in the Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. App. III §§1-16 (1988)).
29 The ordered-liberty analysis suggests that so-called "congressional standing"
should be denied. If standing has as its goal the protection of individual rather than
institutional rights, then congressional standing is inconsistent with these purposes.
Indeed, one avowed purpose of congressional standing is to permit an individual to
protect an institutional interest of Congress-an interest that I claim is not the job of
the courts to protect. See generally Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding that a group of members of Congress had standing to challenge presidential
pocket veto of legislation), cert. granted sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 475 U.S. 1044,
motion denied 419 U.S. 879 (1986), vacated as moot 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
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Goldwater v. Carter2 40 is an example of such a case. Senator
Goldwater challenged President Carter's decision to abrogate a
treaty without Senate advice and consent. In that case it is difficult
or impossible to identify a due-process interest to help inform
analysis of the issue. There is no role for the ordered-liberty
approach, and, I claim, no reason for the Court to interfere with the
political actions of the Executive and Congress. Thus, the Court
could decline to decide the case on threshold grounds such as
standing or political question, or it could equally plausibly deter-
mine on the merits that no violation of the separation of powers
had occurred.24 1 In Goldwater, the Court reached effectively the
same conclusion, albeit for entirely different reasons.
242
The application of the ordered-liberty theory to the cases the
Court has decided involving separated powers often yields the same
result the Court reached, but for reasons different from those
expressed by the Court. That does not diminish the profound
change that its adoption would have on the Court's jurisprudence,
however. The change would lie in enabling the Court for the first
time to embrace a theory, supported by reason, tradition, and
history, that would breathe life into the structural provisions of the
Constitution, dignifying them with a mission and an intelligibility
they have not enjoyed.
CONCLUSION
Judicial efforts to protect the institutional interests of the
various branches of government are misguided. The Court's role in
cases involving separated powers, no less than in those involving the
Bill of Rights, ought to be as vigilant arbiter of process for the
purpose of protecting individuals from the dangers of arbitrary
government. When exercises of power by one branch of govern-
ment, or by coalitions of two or more acting together, threaten the
integrity of government process, then the Court should consider
240 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
241 The ordered-liberty analysis would require an altogether different result if the
specific facts of the case involving a treaty termination included the abrogation of
identifiable individual interests, such as concrete commercial interests. In such a
case, due-process scrutiny might well require judicial intervention.
242 A plurality of the Court found that the case presented a non-justiciable
political question because it involved foreign relations and the Constitution did not
expressly provide an answer to the question presented. See id. at 1002-03 (Rehnquist,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Stevens, J.). Justice Powell found the case
not ripe for review. See id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
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interfering to restore a balance of power, a balance of process. In
the absence of such a threat, however, there is no need for the
Court to step in, and the political branches should be allowed to use
their powers of mutual checks and balances to work out the conflict.
In short, courts should not be in the business of protecting
government. They should be protecting people. That is true, even-
or perhaps especially-in cases involving governmental structure.
Only with that proper mission in mind will the Court be able to
bring a new rationality to its jurisprudence in the area of law
devoted to the separated powers of government. Only then will that
jurisprudence offer any fidelity to the original genius of the
tripartite division of power, and only then will it do justice to the
Constitution "proper," which, after all, was all that we had from the
start.
